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IS CLIMATE CHANGE A THREAT TO 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY?
Mark Nevitt∗
I.  Introduction
We must make no mistake. The facts are clear. Climate change is 
real, and it is accelerating in a dangerous manner. It not only ex-
acerbates threats to international peace and security; it is a threat 
to international peace and security.1
The climate-security century is here. Both the United Nations Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) and the U.S. Fourth National 
Climate Assessment (“NCA”) recently sounded the alarm on climate 
change’s “super-wicked” and destabilizing security impacts.
2
Scientists and 
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1. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council on the Impacts of Cli-
mate Change on International Peace and Security (Jul. 20, 2011), https://www.un.org/sg/en
/content/sg/speeches/2011-07-20/remarks-security-council-impact-climate-change-
international-peace.
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], GLOBAL WARMING 
OF 1.5 CELSIUS, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 11 (2d ed. Jan. 2019), https://www.ipcc.ch
/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_stand_alone_HR.pdf. [hereinafter 
IPCC 1.5 REPORT]; U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, IMPACTS, RISKS, & ADAPTATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 26, 813 (2d ed. 2020), 
nca2018.globalchange.gov [hereinafter NCA 2018]. And the scientific estimates keep getting 
worse. In July 2020, scientists from the Center of Excellence for Climate Extremes projected 
that climate change will cause average temperatures to rise 4.1 to 8.1 degrees if trends hold, a 
massive and catastrophic change to the physical environment. See also S. C. Sherwood, M. J. 
Webb, J. D. Annan, K. C. Armour, P. M. Forster, J. C. Hargreaves, G. Hegerl, S. A. Klein, K. 
D. Marvel, E. J. Rohling, M. Watanabe, T. Andrews, P. Braconnot, C. S. Bretherton, G. L. 
Foster, Z. Hausfather, A. S. von der Heydt, R. Knutti, T. Mauritsen, J. R. Norris, C. Prois-
tosescu, M. Rugenstein, G. A. Schmidt, K. B. Tokarska & M. D. Zelinka, An Assessment of 
Earth’s Climate Sensitivity Using Multiple Lines of Evidence, REV. GEOPHYSICS, (Jul. 22, 
2020), https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/2019RG000678; For a dis-
cussion of climate change’s “super wicked” problems, see Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked 
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security professionals alike reaffirm what we are witnessing with our own 
eyes: The earth is warming at a rapid rate; climate change affects interna-
tional peace and security in complex ways; and the window for international 
climate action is slamming shut.
Yet how did we respond to these climate alarm bells? We did little, 
largely shrugging a collective global shoulder in response to the loss of life 
and bleak scientific reports. U.S. climate leadership slithered away from the 
world stage, announcing its withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord.
3
Brazil’s leadership refused to enforce environmental forest regulations, re-
sulting in devastation to the Amazon rain forest—the vital and purifying 
“lungs of the planet.” The Trump Administration continued massive envi-
ronmental regulatory rollbacks, even dismissing its leading climate scien-
tists.
4
Despite a temporary coronavirus-driven carbon crash, the Global 
Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) levels are the highest in recorded human history.
5
The Arctic ice caps melted at an extraordinary rate. Australia and California 
burned.
Today, there is an ever-widening gap between our understanding of 
climate change’s threats and the international community’s willingness to 
respond to these threats. The IPCC estimates, for example, that the world 
has a shrinking window—approximately one decade—to take massive sub-
stantive action to reduce GHG emissions or else face the wrath of an angry, 
sick planet.
6
Failure to close the emissions gap will result in enormous, cli-
mate-driven disruption.
7
Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).  
3. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]; see also 
Jean Galbraith, Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What they Mean for Climate 
Change Mitigation, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 274 (2018) (highlighting federalism chal-
lenges within the U.S. system to address climate change).  
4. President Bolsonaro was elected as Brazil’s President in 2018. He campaigned to 
massively roll-back environmental and climate regulations to include deforestation. See, e.g.,
Franklin Foer, The Amazon Fires are More Dangerous than WMDs, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/amazon-fires-show-limits-
sovereignty/596779/.
5. See, e.g., Ishaan Tharoor, World’s Climate Catastrophe Intensifies as Focus Re-
mains on Virus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Jun. 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/2020/06/29/worlds-climate-catastrophe-worsens-amid-pandemic/; Brady Dennis &
Chris Mooney, Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Will Hit Another Record This Year, Ex-
perts Project, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/2019/12/03/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-will-hit-yet-another-record-high-
this-year-experts-project/. 
6. See IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18 (highlighting an emissions gap where 
there must be dramatic reductions in Global Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emissions prior to 
2030 to maintain temperatures below 1.5 degrees Celsius). 
7. For an overview of climate change’s destructive impacts on civilization, see Kurt 
M. Campbell & Christine Parthemore, National Security and Climate Change in Perspective,
in CLIMATE CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY & NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF 
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Beyond the global emissions gap, there is an ever-widening global gov-
ernance gap. As climate change destabilizes the physical environment, it 
also destabilizes existing institutions, forcing us to look at their role in com-
batting the climate crisis. Indeed, we must heed earlier calls to action that all 
“relevant organs” within the United Nations intensify their efforts to face 
the climate challenge.
8
Failure to take substantive international action now
will result in further physical destabilization and the potential loss of four 
nations.
9
After all, climate change is legally and politically agnostic: It will 
continue to destabilize and destroy our physical environment irrespective of 
our international governance response.
The Security Council (“Council”) is assuredly one such “relevant or-
gan.” After all, the Council possesses relatively expeditious and broadly 
delegated authorities to take immediate climate action today. Indeed, the 
Council is empowered with powerful legal tools in service of its mission to 
uphold “the maintenance of international peace and security.”
10
In executing 
this role, the Council acts on behalf of all 193 Member nations—who agree 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (Kurt Campbell ed., 2008); see also Abrahm Lustgarten, Refugees Flee 
from the Earth, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 26, 2020, at 11, 18–19 (highlighting that 150 million 
people will be displaced by rising sea levels by 2050).
8. G.A. Res 63/281, at 2 (June 11, 2009) [hereinafter Climate Security 2009] (noting 
in 2009 the U.N. General Assembly called “on all relevant organs of the United Nations, as 
appropriate and within their respective mandates, to identify their efforts in considering and 
addressing climate change, including its possible security implications.”). 
9. It is estimated that four atoll small island developing states (“SIDS”)—Maldives, 
Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands—may be uninhabitable by mid-
century, threating their very sovereignty. See Curt D. Storlazzi, Stephen B. Gingerich, Ap van 
Dongeren, Olivia M. Cheriton, Peter W. Swarzenski, Ellen Quataert, Clifford I. Voss, Donald 
W. Field, Hariharasubramanian Annamalai, Greg A. Piniak & Robert McCall, Most Atolls 
Will be Uninhabitable by the Mid-21st Century Because of Sea Level Rise Exacerbating Wave 
Driven Flooding, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 4–5 (2018), http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/4
/eaap9741. Kiribati recently purchased land in Fiji as part of a potential climate relocation 
plan. Sara Reardon, Pacific Island to Buy Piece of Fiji as a Climate Plan, NEW SCIENTIST
(Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21581-pacific-island-to-buy-piece-
of-fiji-as-climate-plan/. This also raises core human rights issues that are beyond the scope of 
this paper. See generally John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the 
United Nations, 33 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 477, 486 (2009).
10. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under 
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”). For an outstanding overview of 
many of the potential tools available to the U.N. Security Council in addressing climate 
change, see SHIRLEY V. SCOTT & CHARLOTTE KU, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL (Edward Elgar ed., 2018) [hereinafter CLIMATE SECURITY]; Pierre 
Thielbörger, Climate Change and International Peace and Security: Time for a Green Securi-
ty Council?, in FROM COLD WAR TO CYBER WAR 67 (H.J. Heintze & P. Thielbörger eds., 
2016); see also Craig Martin, Atmospheric Intervention, 44 COLUM. ENV’T L. REV. 331 
(2020).
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to be bound by the Council’s actions.
11
The Council’s authority and exper-
tise in international security matters can serve a gap-filling, complementary 
role that works in concert with ongoing climate efforts at the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), Economic and 
Social Council (“ECOSOC”), and the General Assembly.
12
As Professor 
Richard Lazarus has explained, climate change is unlike any other problem 
facing humanity—it is truly a “super-wicked” problem that cuts across 
many disciplines.
13
To meet this super-wicked problem, innovative legal 
governance solutions are required.
Of course, any Council climate action must overcome current political 
paralysis and criticism that climate change is outside the Council mandate. 
But the stakes for Council climate inaction are also high.
14
Failure to com-
prehensively address climate change presents its own unique costs, particu-
larly as climate change threatens the territorial integrity and very sovereign-
ty of several small island nations. The U.N. Charter has sought to uphold the 
principle of sovereign equality of all its Members for the past seventy-five 
years. In doing so, it has played a critical, stabilizing role in shaping the 
post-World War II international order. But climate change is the ultimate 
physical and institutional destabilizer, swallowing nations’ territorial integ-
rity whole, forcing us to look at the international governance landscape with 
fresh eyes. Indeed, the Council’s indifference to nation extinction is fraught 
with its own legitimacy and credibility costs—can the Council afford to 
stand by as climate change swallows nations whole?
To be sure, any Council climate action faces political headwinds. In
part, this can be traced to the Council’s institutional design: Any member of 
the Permanent Five (“P5”) possesses veto power over any proposed Council 
action.
15
Meanwhile, P5 membership (the United States, Russia, the United 
11. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (stating that “Members confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that 
in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”); 
see also U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1 (stating that the purpose of the United Nations is “to maintain 
international peace and security and . . . to take effective collective measures for the preven-
tion and removal of threats to the peace . . .”).
12. As I discuss below, I do not argue (nor do I envision) that the Council should turn 
to its Article 42 military authorities to combat climate change’s impacts at this time or within 
the foreseeable future. U.N. Charter art. 42.
13. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 1159–60.
14. See Dan Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Chal-
lenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 605 (1999); David Ca-
ron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
552, 566, 572 (1993). “Climatizing” the Council exposes the Council to criticism that it is 
overstepping its historic mandate.
15. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶¶ 2–3.  And independent of climate action, there is a rich 
scholarly literature critiquing the Council as hierarchical, anti-democratic, static, and reactive.  
For a critique of the Security Council, see Ken Conca, Joe Thwaites, & Gouen Lee, Climate 
Change and Global Security: What Role for the Security Council?, in FRIEDERICH-EBERT-
STIFTUNG PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (Oct. 2017), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13767.pdf.
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Kingdom, France, and China) remains frozen in time, despite calls for 
membership expansion to better reflect modern geopolitical and economic 
realities. Further complicating matters, the Council is comprised of the 
world’s worst climate offenders who emit the most GHG emissions.
16
Yet the Council has been, in many ways, a dynamic institution since the 
end of the Cold War, at times even demonstrating a willingness to address 
the root causes of global instability. For the Charter’s first forty-five years, 
its original premise of a robust “collective security” agenda was largely 
thwarted by Cold War political realities. Council stonewalling gave way to a 
rejuvenated “Council 2.0” commencing in 1990 with Council action against 
Iraqi aggression and follow-on peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. 
Since then, the Council has expanded its aperture for action to address an 
increasing menu of non-traditional security threats to include global health 
crisis (Ebola and, belatedly, COVID-19), the spread of weapons of mass de-
struction, and the underlying causes of conflict and human suffering.
17
This article argues that climate change’s destabilizing impacts require 
us to look at existing international governance tools at our disposal with 
fresh eyes. As such, Council climate action cannot and should not be dis-
missed out-of-hand. As conflicts rise, migration explodes, and nations are 
extinguished, how long can the Council remain on the climate sidelines?
18
Hence, my call for a re-conceptualized “Council 3.0” to meet the climate-
security challenges this century.
This article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I describe and analyze the 
current state of climate science and the climate-security threats facing the 
world. This includes an analysis of the Council’s unique role and responsi-
bility to maintain international peace and security within the U.N. Charter 
system. In Part III, I describe how the Council’s agenda has evolved in re-
cent years to include a focus on non-traditional security threats to include 
climate change.
19
In doing so, I offer a possible roadmap for Council climate 
16. The United States, Republic of China, Russia, United Kingdom, and France are all 
Permanent Five (“P5”) Members. At the time of this writing, the United States is the largest 
historical emitter of GHG emissions while China emits more GHG emissions on an annual 
basis than any Member nation.  See Ctr. for Climate & Energy Sols., Global Emissions, C2ES
(last visited Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.c2es.org/content/international-emissions
/#:~:text=China%2C%20the%20United%20States%2C%20and,the%20United%20States%20
and%20Russia; see also Mengpin Ge & Johannes Friedrich, 4 Charts Explain Greenhouse 




17. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1625, ¶ 1 (Sept. 14, 2005).
18. See NCA 2018, supra note 2, at 606–37 (highlighting climate change’s internation-
al effects); see also Kirsten Davies & Thomas Riddell, The Warming War: How Climate 
Change is Creating Threats to International Peace and Security, 30 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 47, 
48, 50 (2017).
19. Political calculations by each Security Council member will play an outsized role in 
casting a vote for climate action. Witness the Council’s slow response to the COVID-19 coro-
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action, showcasing how climate change’s existential threat to the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of four Pacific Small Island Developing States 
(“SIDS”) will stress and test Council engagement on climate change.
20
Part 
IV addresses the challenges and opportunities to Council climate action. 
Part V argues that the Council should use its authority under article 39 of 
the U.N. Charter to affirmatively declare climate change a threat to interna-
tional peace and security. Doing so activates a series of measured, gradually 
escalating steps that the Council should take to address the growing interna-
tional climate governance gap. Rather than dismissing Council climate-
involvement, I argue that we should adopt an “institutional risk allocation” 
approach where numerous institutions address climate change in a holistic, 
complementary way.
21
This will require a rejuvenated and reimagined 
“Council 3.0” that requires a normative reconceptualization of the Council’s 
role in upholding peace and security. Part VI concludes.
II. Climate Change Meets International Peace and Security
A. Climate Change’s Destabilizing Security Impacts
We are entering the climate-security century. As climate change desta-
bilizes the physical environment, it also destabilizes existing governance 
structures.
22
The destabilizing effect of climate change forces us to reex-
amine the root causes of instability and the accompanying tools at our col-
lective disposal required to combat the climate crisis.  According to IPCC 
and a near-universal scientific consensus, climate change is “extremely like-
ly” caused by human activity.
23
And a growing number of scholars now per-
suasively argue that we must broaden our definition of security to encom-
navirus crisis.  But there are increased calls for increased Security Council action and that may 
be changing.  See Rob Berschinski, What the UN Security Council Can Do on Coronavirus: A 
Global Goods Coordination Mechanism, JUST SEC. (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/69336/what-the-un-security-council-can-do-on-coronavirus-a-
global-goods-coordination-mechanism/. And Professor Hathaway and others have highlighted 
that we need to re-think how we define and face national security threats in the face of the 
coronavirus.  Oona Hathaway, Covid-19 Shows How the U.S. Got National Security Wrong,
JUST SEC. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69563/covid-19-shows-how-the-u-s-
got-national-security-wrong/. 
20. It is estimated that four atoll Small Island Developing States—Maldives, Tuvalu, 
Kiribati, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands—may be uninhabitable by mid-century, 
threating their very sovereignty.  See Storlazzi et al., supra note 9, at 4–5. 
21. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107, art. 4 [hereinafter Framework Convention].
22. See, e.g., Mark P. Nevitt, Climate Change: Our Greatest National Security 
Threat?,  JUST SEC. (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63673/climate-change-our-
greatest-national-security-threat/ (referring to the twenty-first century as “the climate-security 
century”).
23. See IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (highlighting recent studies that predict an 
increase in global temperatures up to 8.1 degrees Fahrenheit).
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pass climate change, pandemics, and non-traditional threats that have debili-
tating impacts on health and human security.
24
Consider just a few recent examples of climate change’s destructive 
path. In the past two years, massive wildfires destroyed large swaths of Aus-
tralia and California.
25
Hurricanes Michael and Florence ravaged the coast-
lines of Florida and North Carolina.
26
Water shortages, food security, and 
crop instability—all exacerbated by climate change—contributed to a rapid-
ly deteriorating security situation in many developing nations.
27
Scholars 
now make data-driven, empirical connections between climate change and 
increases in violent conflict.
28
Both climate scientists and national security 
professionals forecast a dangerous world increasingly defined by climate 
change.
29
Consider the following four ways that climate change impacts in-
ternational peace and security:
• Extreme Weather. The American Meteorological Society re-
cently found that anthropogenic climate change increased the 
likelihood and severity of fifteen out of sixteen recent extreme 
weather events.
30
As climate scientists refine their models, we 
24. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 19 (arguing that we should broaden the security 
lens to include pandemics, other public health threats, and climate change).
25. California Wildfire that Killed Nearly 85 People Nearly Contained, REUTERS
(Nov. 25, 2018,,), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-wildfires/california-wildfire-
that-killed-at-least-85-people-fully-contained-idUSKCN1NU0A9; see also Linda Givetash, 
Australian Wildfires Declared Among the ‘Worst Wildfire Disasters in Modern History,’ NBC
NEWS (July 28, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/australian-wildfires-declared-
among-worst-wildlife-disasters-modern-history-n1235071.
26. Dakin Andone, Death Toll From Hurricane Michael Rises to 36, CNN (Oct. 20, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/20/us/hurricane-michael-death-toll/index.html; Gabriel-
la Borter, Hurricane Florence Death Toll Rises to 51, REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2018,),  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-florence/hurricane-florence-death-toll-rises-to-51-
idUSKCN1MC2JJ.
27. Campbell & Parthemore, supra note 7, at 14; see also Emily Atkin, Climate 
Change is Aggravating the Suffering in Yemen, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/152011/climate-change-aggravating-suffering-yemen.
28. Kendra Sakaguchi, Anil Varghese & Graeme Auld, Climate Wars? A Systematic 
Review of Empirical Analysis on the Links Between Climate Change and Violent Conflict, 19
INT’L STUD. REV. 622, 622 (2017) (summarizing the existing empirical literature, noting that a 
“majority of studies find evidence that climate variables are associated with higher levels of 
violent conflict”).
29. For example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a report ac-
knowledging the global human security challenge posed by climate change. See, e.g., DANIEL 
R. COATS, U.S. DIR. NAT’L INTEL., STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT 
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 21–23 (Jan. 29, 2019) 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—-SSCI.pdf.
30. Yan Yu, John P. Dunne, Elena Shevliakova, Paul Ginoux, Sergey Malyshev, Jas-
min G. John & John P. Krasting, Increased Risk of the 2019 Alaskan July Fires Due to Antro-
pogenic Activity, in EXPLAINING EXTREME EVENTS OF 2019 FROM A CLIMATE PERSPECTIVE 
S1 (Stephanie C. Herring, Nikolaos Christidis, Andrew Hoell, Martin P. Hoerling & Peter A. 
Stott eds., 2021). 
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will be able to predict with greater certainty the future likeli-
hood of extreme weather events and better pinpoint their size, 
location and devastating effects.
• Climate migrants.31 We have witnessed the rise of cross-
border climate change migrants that are fleeing their homes in 
response to climate-exacerbated drought and other environ-
mental hazards. Future climate migrant estimates look bleak: 
one study found that two-thirds of the world’s population faces 
severe water shortages, a driver of cross-border human migra-
tion.
32
The Syrian refugee crisis, for example, was preceded by 
a massive, climate-exacerbated drought that saw internal dis-
placement from rural areas to cities within Syria. This created 
the conditions for political unrest that quickly spread outside 
Syria’s borders.
33
Yet there is a widening international govern-
ance gap to address this pending explosion in climate migra-
tion.
34
Will the Council play a role in mitigating the effects on 
the hundreds of millions of climate migrants anticipated this 
century?
• Climate Change and Armed Conflict. Studies predict an in-
creasingly dangerous, Hobbesian world where climate-driven 
food insecurity, resource wars, and physical destabilization 
lead to armed conflict, violence, and chaos.
35
Scholars now 
demonstrate a linkage between climate change’s impacts and 
violent conflict.
36
The Council specifically connected climate 
31. There is a broad literature on what to call people displaced by climate change (envi-
ronmental refugees, climate refugees, or climate migrants?). I use the broader term of “climate 
migrants” throughout the paper as it best captures the numerous reasons—all driven by cli-
mate change—why people flee their homes. For a helpful discussion of this academic debate, 
see Philip Dane Warren, Note, Evaluating Climate Change Displacement, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 2103, 2109–10 (2017).
32. Nicholas St. Fleur, Two-Thirds of the World Faces Severe Water Shortages, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/science/two-thirds-of-the-
world-faces-severe-water-shortages.html.; Figures at a Glance, U.N. HUM. RTS. COMM’N,
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited Aug 4, 2020).
33. See F. De Châtel, The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Upris-
ing: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution, 50 MIDDLE E. STUD. 521, 526 (2014).
34. For an outstanding discussion of the gaps in international law as it related to refu-
gees, see Jill Goldenziel, The Curse of the Nation-State: Refugees, Migration, and Security in 
International Law, 48 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 579 (2016); see also Lustgarten, supra note 7, at 11–23.
35. Campbell & Parthemore, supra note 7, at 19; CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 16–18, 39 (2007),  
https://www.cna.org/reports/climate (noting that climate change’s destabilizing impacts in-
clude reduced access to fresh water, impaired food production, health catastrophes, displace-
ment of major populations, greater potential for failed states to include a rise in terrorism, 
mass migrations, and escalation of conflicts over resources) [hereinafter CNA 2007].  
36. Sakaguchi et al., supra note 28, at 623 (providing a systematic, empirical analysis 
connecting climate change with violent conflict).
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change’s impacts to a conflict area in a series of recent Security 
Council Resolutions. This reinforces the Council’s competence 
in tackling threats to international peace and security in conflict 
areas.
37
Will the Council build upon these efforts in addressing 
climate change’s role in resource wars and conflict?
• Nation Extinction. Scientists now predict that four Pacific 
Small Island Developing States will be uninhabitable by mid-
century due to climate change-driven sea level rise and wave-
driven flooding.
38
These nations will lose large swaths of their 
territory, potentially leading to wholesale abandonment. Will 
the Council—which has the express responsibility to maintain 
peace and security—stand by while nations lose their territorial 
integrity and, potentially, their sovereignty?
39
These four examples—extreme weather, climate migration, armed con-
flict, and nation extinction—are a mere snapshot of climate change’s securi-
ty impacts this century.
Despite these threats, our international legal governance institutions 
have not kept pace. They have lagged behind on making scientific advances, 
failing to address climate change’s security implications. As of this writing, 
we lack a legally binding path forward to lower worldwide GHG emissions. 
Indeed, scientists and security professionals estimate that our collective fail-
ure to keep the average global temperatures from rising above two degrees 
Celsius will have devastating consequences, particularly for developing na-
tions with limited climate adaptation resources.
40
Increases in global tem-
perature beyond two degrees could potentially trigger climate “tipping 
points,” pouring gasoline on an already simmering climate fire. Further, 
climate attribution science advances showcase that climate change increases 
the likelihood of extreme weather throughout the world.
41
In response to our increased understanding of climate change’s security 
impacts, scientists and policy experts have begun to adopt a security ver-
nacular. Climate change is not just an environmental concern—it acts as 
both a “threat multiplier” and a “catalyst for conflict.”
42
The 2015 Paris 
37. See S.C. Res. 2349 ¶ 26 (Oct. 14, 2017) (recognizing climate change’s adverse ef-
fects on water scarcity, drought, and desertification in the Lake Chad Basin region).  
38. See Storlazzi et al., supra note 9, at 4.
39. Id.
40. IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 2.
41. Yu et al., supra note 30, at 11; see also Sarah Kaplan & Angela Fritz, Climate 
Change was Behind 15 Weather Disasters in 2017, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2018, 3:55 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/12/10/climate-change-was-behind-weather-
disasters/?utm_term=.61d93dce8d7d.
42. CNA MILITARY ADVISORY BD., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ACCELERATING 
RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2–5 (2014) [hereinafter CNA 2014].  In addition, former Defense 
Secretary William Perry claimed that climate change’s security challenges are comparable to 
nuclear war.  See Jeff McMahon, Former Defense Secretary Compares Climate Change to 
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Climate Agreement labels climate change an “urgent threat” while recogniz-
ing climate change’s pernicious impacts on food security.
43
Due to scien-
tific advances, we now have a much clearer understanding of the relation-
ship between human activity, climate change, and global security.
44
COVID-19’s ongoing deadly global impact—the United States has lost 
more people to COVID-19 than all conflicts since World War II—bolsters 
the need to reconceptualize and broaden traditional notions of threats to 
human and national security.
45
Tragically, the novel coronavirus crisis may 
foreshadow even greater global health threats as climate change accelerates 
the spread of vector-borne diseases around the world.
46
But COVID-19 may 
signal the beginning of a new era of public health threats, forcing us to re-
conceptualize traditional notions of security.
B. The Security Council’s Responsibility for the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security
In the following section, I analyze the Council’s institutional design, 
delegated legal authorities, and how conceptions of “legitimacy” impact po-
tential Council climate action.
47
1. The Council’s Delegated Legal Authorities & Institutional Design
The Council is composed of both permanent and non-permanent mem-
bers. P5 membership has remained constant since 1945, a source of enor-
mous controversy and criticism since the Charter’s inception. The remaining 
ten Council seats are held by rotating, non-permanent Members elected for 
two-year terms.
48
Highly competitive and sought after, membership eligibil-
Nuclear War, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2018/12/09
/former-defense-secretary-compares-climate-change-to-nuclear-war/?sh=4848660c60bb.  
43. See IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 2.  
44. See Yu et al., supra note 30 (finding that fifteen of sixteen extreme weather events 
were made more likely by human caused climate change).
45. Scholars have debated whether it is best to frame climate change as a “human secu-
rity” or “national security” issue. For a discussion of this debate, see Maryam Jamshidi, The
Climate Change Crisis is a Human Security, Not a National Security Issue, 93 S. CAL. L.
REV. POSTSCRIPT 36, 36 (2019).
46. The COVID-19 crisis, while not directly related to climate change, may foreshadow 
future global health risks as climate change increases the risk posed by vector-borne diseases.  
See NCA 2018, supra note 2, at 616 (describing climate change’s role in exacerbating vector-
borne diseases such as Zika and West Nile virus that are transmitted by mosquitos).
47. U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. For a discussion of the role of the Security Council in the 
face of climate change, see Trina Ng, Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming 
World: A Role for the Security Council, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 275, 275 (2010) (arguing 
that climate change threats are “tantamount to threats to international peace and security given 
the evolution of threats since . . .  1945”).
48. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1 (outlining the criteria for election to the Council, noting 
“due regard” is paid to Members contributing to the maintenance of international peace and 
security and to “equitable geographical distribution.”).
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ity for these ten seats must take into account both “equitable geographic dis-
tribution,” as well as Member nations’ respective contribution to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
49
In addition, thirty-eight of 
the 193 U.N. Members states are designated SIDS that most acutely suffer 
from climate change’s debilitating effects.
50
The Charter’s guidance on 
Council non-permanent membership eligibility, and a comparably large 
contingent of SIDS, suggest that climate change will play a role in the 
Council’s rotating membership.
51
As a parliamentary matter, the Council does not require the vote of eve-
ry Member nation—any Council vote simply requires nine affirmative votes 
and the concurrence (or abstention) of all five permanent members.
52
If this 
voting threshold is met, Council decisions bind the other Member States.
53
Hence, the Council could potentially serve as an expedient international 
venue to address climate change.
54
The U.N. Charter’s express purpose is to maintain international peace 
and security,
55
and “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
of its members.”
56
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reaffirms the prohibition 
on the use of force. Member nations must “refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state. . .”
57
And under article 24 of the U.N. Char-
ter, the Council has “primary responsibility” to ensure international peace 
and security.
58
With this authority comes a special responsibility—with af-
firmative duties—for the Council to take measures on behalf of other Mem-
ber nations to ensure international peace and security.
49. Id.
50. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 2.
51. Perhaps not surprisingly, Greta Thunberg and other climate activists scrutinized the 
climate policies of both Norway and Canada during the most recent Council election in 2020. 
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
52. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶¶ 2–3; see Ian Hurd, The UN Security Council and the Inter-
national Rule of Law, CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 1, 11 (2014) (discussing that, although the Char-
ter is silent on the legal import of abstaining from a vote, from the Council’s first meetings, 
permanent member abstention was not treated the same as a veto. This has been the operating 
consensus ever since.).
53. U.N. Charter art. 25.
54. And the Security Council has shown the ability to act relatively quickly in using its 
powers. In the aftermath of September 11
th
, the Security Council passed Resolution 1373 in 
under one month. S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  For a broader discussion of S.C. 1373, see
infra Part III.A.2.
55. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
56. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1.
57. Id. art. 2, ¶ 4.
58. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under 
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”)(emphasis added).
538 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:527
The Council, acting on behalf of all other Member States, can tap into 
its broad enforcement authorities, but only when it has first made a determi-
nation that a situation rises to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression” within the meaning of article 39.
59
While the Council has 
broad discretion in making this legal determination, doing so must still con-
form with the U.N. Charter’s governing Purposes and Principles.
60
And the 
Council must follow-through with effective enforcement and follow-
through—something that the Council has historically struggled to do.
Of course, there must be a bona fide threat to international peace and 
security—purely domestic impacts are beyond the Council’s purview. The 
Council is prohibited from intervening “in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . .”
61
GHG emissions and cli-
mate change’s corresponding impacts do not respect neat political bounda-
ries.  And there is an increased understanding that seemingly domestic cli-
mate change matters can spill across international borders quickly, making 
the international and domestic distinction increasingly a gray area and not a 
strict dichotomy.
62
2. Council Action: Legitimacy Concerns
Simply because the Council can take an action, does that mean it 
should? To be sure, the Council possesses discretion in determining what 
rises to a “threat to the peace,” a key term that is undefined under the U.N. 
Charter.
63
If the Council determines that climate change is a threat to the 
peace within the meaning of article 39, the door is unlocked to powerful 
Chapter VII authorities.
64
But core legal and political legitimacy concerns 
are always lurking in the background. These must be considered prior to the 
Council tackling climate change.
Broadly speaking, legitimacy is the belief of an agent that a rule or in-
stitution has a right to be obeyed.
65
The Council has few instruments to en-
sure compliance with its decisions. While Council resolutions are legally 
59. U.N. Charter art. 39.
60. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 2. 
61. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
62. Cf. Thielbörger, supra note 10, at 67–74.  
63. U.N. Charter art. 39.
64. Id.; see also Christopher K. Penny, Greening the Security Council: Climate Change 
as an Emerging “Threat to International Peace and Security”, 7 INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS
35, 53–54 (2007); Actions with Respect to Threat to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression, UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, www.un.org.securicy council/content
/repertoire/actions (last visited July 27, 2020) (listing historic information when the Council 
“has determined the existence of a threat and examines instances where the existence of a 
threat was debated”). 
65. Hurd, supra note 52, at 7–8; see, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 
(2006); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Consti-
tutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (overviewing legal legitimacy).
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mandatory, they still depend on states “believing that they have an interest 
in going along with them.”
66
Professor Dan Bodansky and others have con-
vincingly argued that democratic government legitimacy principles can be 
applied to international governance. As international institutions gain great-
er authority, their consensual underpinnings erode.
67
Legitimate authority is 
synonymous with justified authority. “Legitimacy” has a normative and so-
cio-political dimension where perceived legitimacy can affect the Council’s 
ability to carry out decisions.
68
Consider the growing connection between sociological-based legitima-
cy and climate activism surrounding Council membership elections. In the 
last Council election for non-permanent Membership, nations had their cli-
mate policies and commitment to sustainability heavily scrutinized.
69
Greta 
Thunberg and other climate change activists, for example, recently spoke 
out against the climate policies of two prospective non-permanent Security 
Council members (Canada and Norway) in this year’s Council election. The 
climate activists argued that these nations were overly reliant on fossil fuels 
and should take steps to divest their economies from fossil fuels as a condi-
tion for Council membership.
70
While the precise efficacy of these climate-advocacy efforts remains 
unclear (Norway was elected, but Canada was not), it nevertheless show-
cased the increasing role that climate policies will have on shaping govern-
ance structures and their follow-on actions. The increased awareness of cli-
mate change’s devastating impacts—embodied by the work of international 
climate activists such as Greta Thunberg, popular writing such as David 
Wallace-Wells’s Uninhabitable Earth, and advocacy-legislation such as the 
American Green New Deal—suggest a growing acceptance for international 
climate action and a groundswell of support for popular legitimacy.
71
C. Chapter VI Authorities: Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (“Pacific Settlement of Disputes”) rein-
forces the U.N. Charter’s underlying goal of settling disputes by peaceful 
means, laying out the Council’s broad investigation powers.
72
Chapter VI 
actions can be taken without an article 39 “threat to the peace” determina-
66. Hurd, supra note 52, at 8. 
67. Bodansky, supra note 14, at 597.  
68. Id. at 601.  
69. Megan Darby, Greta Thunberg Looks to U.N. Security Council Election for Lever-
age on Climate, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (June 6, 2020), https://www.climatechangenews.com
/2020/06/10/greta-thunberg-seeks-influence-un-security-council-election/
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH (2019).
72. See U.N. Charter art. 33. (“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”).
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tion.  Article 34 outlines the Council’s broad investigatory powers to “inves-
tigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction 
or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of 
the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of internation-
al peace and security.”
73
The Council may act on disputes by “recommending appropriate proce-
dures or methods of adjustment.”
74
In addition, any Member nation may 
bring “any dispute” to the attention of the Council or General Assembly.
75
The Council, in turn, may recommend “appropriate procedures” to settle the 
dispute or take a specific action such as referring the dispute to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (“ICJ”).
76
Under article 96 of the U.N. Charter, either the Council or the General 
Assembly may request that the ICJ “give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question.” Alternatively, the Secretary-General may bring any matter which 
may threaten the maintenance of peace and security to the Security Coun-
cil.
77
Climate-security matters could, theoretically, be brought before the 
ICJ.
78
But as Professor Michael Gerrard and others have opined, the ICJ is 
not a particularly promising path for transformative or even substantive cli-
mate action.
79
Outside the climate change context, the ICJ’s jurisdiction and 
enforcement mandate is not universally accepted.
80
Other international tri-
bunals have recently addressed climate security matters, shining much 
needed light on asylum seekers from SIDS.
81
Under my institutional risk al-
location approach to climate governance discussed below, I welcome efforts 
from competent international tribunals to address climate-security matters—
73. U.N. Charter art. 34. 
74. U.N. Charter art. 36 ,¶ 1.
75. U.N. Charter art. 35, ¶ 1. 
76. U.N. Charter art. 36, ¶¶ 1–3. 
77. U.N. Charter art. 99.
78. U.N. Charter art. 96, ¶ 1.
79. See Michael B. Gerrard, Professor, Colum. L. Sch., Statement at the Security 
Council Open Arria Formula Meeting: The Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for 
Global Security (June 30, 2015), http://www.spainun.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07
/Michael-Gerrard_CC_201506.pdf (stating that seeking an ICJ advisory opinion on principles 
of international law in the mitigation context is not a fruitful path).
80. See, e.g., Scott R. Anderson, Walking Away from the World Court, LAWFARE, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/walking-away-world-court (Oct. 5, 2018) (referencing the U.S. 
decision to withdraw its consent to the ICJ’s general compulsory jurisdiction); see Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14. 
81. In 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Counsel recently addressed climate se-
curity arising from an asylum seeker from a Small Island Developing States.  While it remains 
to be seen how this ruling will be implemented by different nations, it nevertheless demon-
strates climate change’s threats posed to developing nations. See Rob Picheta, Climate Refu-
gees Cannot Be Sent Back Home, United Nations Rules in Landmark Decision, CNN (Jan. 20, 
2020) https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/20/world/climate-refugees-unhrc-ruling-scli-intl
/index.html.
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provided that they act within their competence and jurisdiction. But I ulti-
mately share Professor Gerrard’s skepticism that the ICJ or other relevant 
international human rights bodies can or will play a leading role in address-
ing climate change.
D. Climate Change and the Council’s Chapter VII Authorities
Under Chapter VII, the Council enjoys broad powers to restore and 
maintain international peace and security.
82
Before the Council can activate 
these broad enforcement authorities, it must first determine whether a 
“threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” exists under 
article 39.
83
In making this critical determination, the Council shall:
[D]etermine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
84
Of the three possible article 39 determinations—(1) threat to the peace; 
(2) breach of the peace; or (3) act of aggression, the Council heavily relies 
upon “threat to the peace” when addressing non-traditional security 
threats.
85
“Threat to the peace” is undefined within the Charter; the Council 
is granted broad discretion in making this determination.
86
If the Council 
makes an article 39 determination, its powerful Chapter VII authorities are 
then actuated—a legally expedient approach but one that must take into ac-
count core legitimacy concerns.
87
If the Council overcomes political paraly-
sis in declaring climate change a threat to the peace, what steps might the 
Council take?
Article 40 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Council to “call upon the 
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measure as it deems nec-
essary or desirable.”
88
If article 40 measures prove ineffective, the Council 
could next employ article 41 economic or diplomatic measures against na-
82. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.  Any Council action must be consistent with the UN 
Charter, Chapter I, “Purposes and Principles.” U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 2.
83. U.N. Charter art. 39.
84. Id. art. 39 (emphasis added).
85. I define non-traditional security threats somewhat capaciously to include global 
health, environmental and climate security, gender security, and the threats posed by non-state 
actors. As I discuss supra Part II.A, the Council has shown a willingness to address such 
threats.
86. Robert Cryer, The Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to Coherence?, 1 J.
ARMED CONFLICT L. 161, 163 (1996). See Bodansky, supra note 14 at 179; see also Anna M. 
Vrandenburgh, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Charter: Do They Trump Hu-
man Rights Law?, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 175, 178–79 (1991). 
87. This chapter is titled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression” and is addressed in Articles 39-51.  
88. U.N. Charter art. 40.
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tions engaging in extremely harmful climate activities. This authorizes non-
military measures, such as economic sanctions, against nations that engage 
in actions that threaten international peace and security.
89
To be sure, mov-
ing from article 40 to 41 will increase the action’s underlying legitimacy 
risk as the Council ratchets from soft measures to hard compliance 
measures. As discussed infra Part V, article 41 sanctions could take many 
forms.  The Council could directly sanction so-called “climate rogue states” 
or move to ban the import of a particularly harmful climate product or indi-
vidual. Brazil’s massive deforestation efforts that destroy the Amazon rain-
forest are but one prominent example. But well-intentioned economic sanc-
tions may counter harmful state action and also end up harming the most 
vulnerable citizens.
90
If the article 41 non-military measures prove to be inadequate, the 




Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action 
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, 
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
92
As I discuss infra Part V, I do not recommend the Council employ mili-
tary measures to address climate change now or in the foreseeable future. 
Regardless of the legitimacy or practicality of the Council taking climate 
action today, the Council has the authority to act in a relatively expeditious 
manner.
E. Climate Change and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense
Independent of the Council’s Chapter VI and VII authorities, each 
Member nation possesses the inherent right of self-defense in the event of 
an “armed attack.”
93
“Armed attack” includes self-defense against non-state 
89. Id. art. 41. I borrow the term “climate rogue states” from Professor Martin to de-
scribe nations that engage in egregiously destructive environmental behavior with a dispropor-
tionate impact on climate change.  See Martin, supra note 10, at 334.
90. E.g. Catherine Tinker, “Environmental Security” in the United Nations: Not a Mat-
ter for the Security Council, 59 TENN. L. REV. 787, 794 (1992) (stating that sanctions often 
punish the citizens of the target state more than its leaders).
91. Martin, supra note 10, at 335.
92. U.N. Charter art. 42.
93. Id. art. 51. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully flesh out the legal standard 
associated with “armed attack” and the inherent right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter. 
See, e.g., Christine Gray, Climate Change and the Law on the Use of Force, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 219, 236–38 (Rosemary Rayfuse & 
Shirley V. Scott eds., 2012).
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actors, but climate change poses additional, practical problems in addressing 
both its causality and attribution.
94
Nevertheless, some scholars have begun 
to theorize that climate change provides a just cause for war, at least in prin-
ciple.
95
Professor Craig Martin has opened the dialogue for expanding the 
doctrine of self-defense in the case of atmospheric intervention.
96
How might the right of self-defense apply to climate-security impacts? 
Consider the case of a SIDS whose territory is threatened by sea level rise 
and wave-driven flooding. Climate change is not a traditional armed attack 
within the meaning of article 51, but its security impacts—loss of land 
through sea level rise, extreme weather, drought—are no less devastating. 
But lowering the legal bar or fundamentally changing our collective under-
standing of what constitutes an armed attack has enormous normative con-
sequences for article 51 and the right to use force.
97
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address the enormous nor-
mative implications that a fundamental reconceptualization of article 51 as 
applied to climate change would entail. The slowly burning climate crisis 
and widening emissions gap is, nevertheless, forcing scholars to try to rec-
oncile climate change with traditional use of force conceptions.
98
As dis-
cussed below, the Council has shown an increased willingness to address 
the root causes of armed conflict, to include an increased willingness to ad-
dress climate change in Council resolutions and Council-sponsored de-
bates.
99
III. Security Council Engagement on Non-Traditional Security 
Threats
In what follows, I analyze the Council’s steady evolution and willing-
ness to address the root causes of threats to international peace and security. 
In some cases—such as its Ebola response—the Council made an article 39 
threat to the peace determination. The Council’s action on Ebola, in particu-
lar, offers a potential roadmap for future climate engagement. While politi-
cal obstacles remain, the Council has demonstrated a halting, but unmistak-
94. This makes it exceedingly difficult to invoke Article 51 to pierce the jus ad bellum 
regime.  
95. E.g. Adam Betz, Preventive Environmental Wars, 18 J. MIL. ETHICS 223, 223 
(2019) (arguing that the “types and scale of prospective harms threatened by climate change 
are such that, were they to result from an armed attack, there would unequivocally be a just 
cause for war”).  Professor Betz acknowledges that while environmental war may be justified 
in principle, there are challenges in practice.  Id. at 233–37.
96. See Martin, supra note 10, at 383–92.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., id.
99. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2349, ¶ 26 (Oct. 14, 2017). (recognizing climate change’s ad-
verse effects in water scarcity, drought, and desertification in the Lake Chad Basin region). 
The Lake Chad resolution was followed up by Council references to climate security in four 
Security Council Resolutions in Somalia, Darfur, West Africa and the Sahel, and Mali.  
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able, willingness to broaden its jurisdiction to address the root causes to 
threats to international peace and security.
100
A. The Council’s Evolving Definition of “Threat to the Peace”
Following limited Council action during the Cold War—where the 
United States and Soviet Union threatened to veto each other’s actions, thus 
nullifying any Council action—the Council has shown a willingness to ex-
pand its definition of what rises to a threat to international peace and securi-
ty. Beyond the changing political reality, what might account for this 
change?
First, “threat to the peace” lacks a precise definition within the Charter. 
The Council is essentially afforded extraordinary discretion in making such 
a critical legal determination. The Council’s broad discretionary authority in 
making a threat to the peace determination was reaffirmed in the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s decision in Prosecu-
tor v. Tadic.  In Tadic, the Court held that while an “act of aggression” is 
more amenable to a legal determination, “threat to the peace” is more of a 
political concept.101 As a political rather than a legal judgment, the Coun-
cil’s authority “expands each time it finds a new kind of problem to be a 
threat to the peace.”
102
Of course, any Council action remains bound by a 
variety of factors, including the Charter’s Purposes and Principles and the 
action’s accepted legitimacy from other Member States.
103
Second, we now have a better awareness of the linkage between the un-
derlying causes of conflict and its corresponding effects. This includes the 
threat to international peace and security posed by environmental destruc-
tion, non-state actors, weapons proliferation, and global pandemics. In what 
follows, I analyze five key instances where the Council displayed a willing-
ness to go beyond traditional collective security matters, expanding its con-
ception of what may constitute a threat to international peace and security.
1. Root Causes of Conflict: Environmental and Climate Security
The Council was confronted with massive environmental destruction by 
Iraqi leadership during the 1990 Persian Gulf War. In the aftermath, the 
Council passed a resolution declaring that Iraq was “liable under interna-
tional law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and 
the depletion of natural resources . . . as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion 
100. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1625, pmbl. (Sept. 14, 2005) (“[r]eaffirming the need to adopt a 
broad strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the root causes of armed conflict and 
political and social crises”).
101. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-91-1-AR72, Establishment of the International 
Tribunal, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 20, 1995).
102. Hurd, supra note 52, at 5. 
103. See supra Part II.B.1; see also THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY 
AMONG NATIONS (1990).
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and occupation of Kuwait.”
104
Following the conclusion of the armed con-
flict, in 1992, the Council acknowledged that ecological and social issues 
could also constitute threats to international peace and security:
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not 
in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian, and 
ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.
105
The then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s destruction of the oil fields 
was inextricably linked to the Council’s Resolution and action in an interna-
tional armed conflict. By recognizing and acknowledging the destructive 
capacity of ecological harms, however, the Council took an initial step to-
ward conceptualizing a broader framework of threats to international peace 
and security beyond merely interstate conflict.
The environmental security connection was further addressed in 2004, 
when then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed new and emerg-
ing threats to international security. He specifically identified environmental 
degradation and climate change as the driver of natural disasters that un-
dermine international peace and security.
106
In 2005, U.N. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan stated:
The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include 
not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized 
crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also in-
clude poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degra-
dation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences.
107
In 2005, the Council reaffirmed that it was prepared to address the root 
cause of armed conflict—in the context of conflict’s disparate effects on 
women and gender issues more broadly— in an effort to “adopt a broad 
strategy of conflict prevention.”
108
In 2006, Secretary Annan followed up his 
earlier pronouncements on environmental security, stating that “[g]lobal 
climate change must take its place alongside [the] threats [of]. . . conflict, 
104. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 1991).  This marked the first time that the Council de-
termined that a state was liable for harm to the environment itself, apart from injury to people 
and property. Tinker, supra note 90, at 789. 
105. U.N. SCOR, 3406
th
mtg., at 143, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (Jan. 31, 1992). For a brief 
discussion of the Council’s approach to soft threats, see Mark P. Nevitt, The Commander in 
Chief’s Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 492–95 (2015).
106. The panel noted, “ . . . [i]f climate change produces more acute flooding, heat 
waves, droughts and storms, this pace [of natural disasters] may accelerate.” Anand Panyara-
chun, Chairman, High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, & Change, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A More Se-
cure World]. 
107. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, ¶ 78, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
108. S.C. Res. 1625, pmbl. (Sept. 14, 2005).
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poverty, [and] the proliferation of deadly weapons . . . that have traditionally 
monopolized first-order political attention.”
109
2. The Legislative Council: Terrorism (2001) and the Spread of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004)
110
In the aftermath of the September 11
th
terrorist attacks against the Unit-
ed States, the Council passed Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. The 
Council expressly declared that the terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsyl-
vania, and Washington “constitute a threat to international peace and securi-
ty.”
111
In doing so, it reaffirmed the need to “combat by all means . . . threats 
to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”
112
Drawing up-
on its broad Chapter VII authorities and (at that time) overwhelming inter-
national support for action, the Council required all Member States to pass 
domestic legislation to both “prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist 
acts” and “freeze . . . funds and other financial assets . . . of persons who 
commit . . . terrorist acts.”
113
Each Member nation was further required to 
adopt domestic legislation to criminalize the “willful provision or collection, 
by any means . . . of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the 
intention that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts.”
114
Three years later, in 2004, the Council made a similar determination 
addressing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”)—to in-
clude nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  In making an article 39 
threat to the peace determination,
115
the Council cracked down on terrorism 
financing and strengthened border controls to counter the illegal import of 
WMD materials.
116
Specifically, the Council required states to “refrain from 
permitting non-state actors access to WMDs and their means of delivery, 
enforce domestic laws prohibiting non-state actors access to WMDs, and 
109. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twelfth Session, Nairobi Framework, 
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2006/5 (Jan. 26, 2007).
110. For a discussion of the Security Council as a legislative body, see Eric Rosand, The
Security Council as “Global Legislator:” Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 542, 544, 546 (2004); Alexandra Knight, Note, Global Environmental Threats, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1569, n.97 (2005).  For a discussion within the international relations 
literature of the Security Council’s role in combatting climate change, see Ken Conca, Joe 
Thwaites & Goueun Lee, Climate Change and the UN Security Council: Bully Pulpit or Bull
in a China Shop?, GLOB. ENVTL. POL., May 2017, at 1, 2.
111. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶  3  (Sept. 28, 2001).  
112. Id. para. 5. 
113. Id. ¶¶ 1(a), 1(c).
114. Id. ¶¶ 1(a), 1(c).
115. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1 (Apr. 28, 2004).
116. Id. ¶ 2, 3(c).  
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develop and maintain border controls to prevent the proliferation of 
WMDs.”
117
The Council’s sweeping actions to address terrorism and the spread of 
WMDs via implementing domestic legislation remain controversial to this 
day. Nevertheless, they showcased the Council’s ability to go beyond inter-
state conflict and state aggression in making a threat to the peace determina-
tion within article 39 and follow through with aggressive Chapter VII man-
dates. It also demonstrated how quickly the Council can take ex post action 
following a catastrophic event. This marked an expansion of the Council’s 
jurisdiction, which is a significant transformation from the Council’s Cold 
War stasis.
3. Security Council Action and Natural Disaster Response: Haiti (2010)
The Council has also shown a willingness to act, ex post, in response to 
natural disasters. In responding to a devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010 
that killed up to 300,000 people, the Council adopted Resolution 1908.
118
This Resolution expanded a pre-existing United Nations Stabilization Mis-
sion in Haiti to include the “immediate recovery, reconstruction and stabil-
ity efforts” undertaken by the Government of Haiti.
119
In response to the 
earthquake, the Security Council also authorized an increase in the number 
of military and police personnel assigned to the mission.
120
The Council did not explicitly mention climate change in the Resolu-
tion, and it is unclear if the Council would have ever acted in Haiti if an ex-
isting U.N. security mission was not already in place. Yet recent climate at-
tribution science advances elucidate that climate change will cause an uptick 
in extreme weather, stressing the international community’s ability to re-
spond to future natural disasters.
121
The Council’s response in the 2010 Hai-
tian earthquake suggests, however, that ex post responses to extreme weath-
er events are already within the Council’s zone of competence. It remains to 
be seen, however, whether the Council will take proactive, ex ante climate 
measures outside of armed conflict or independent of an existing U.N. mis-
sion.
117. Id.; see also Shirley V. Scott & Roberta C.D. Andrade, The Global Response to 
Climate Change: Can the Security Council Assume a Lead Role?, 18 BROWN J. WORLD AFFS.
215, 221 (2012). Some security experts have linked climate change to an uptick in terrorist 
activity and developing nations have analogized climate change to both terrorism and WMDs. 
See, e.g., CNA 2014, supra note 42.  Acknowledging this reality, the President of Nauru re-
cently compared the threats posed by climate change to the threats posed by nuclear prolifera-
tion and terrorism. 
118. S.C. Res. 1908 (July 17, 2010).
119. Id. ¶ 1.
120. Id. ¶ 2.
121. See generally Yu et al., supra note 30.
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4. The Council & International Public Health Crisis: 
HIV/AIDS (2000, 2011)
In 2000, the Council addressed the global HIV/AIDS health crisis via 
Resolution 1308.
122
  The Resolution “stress[ed] the need of coordinated ef-
forts of all relevant United Nations organizations.”
123
It further noted that the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, “if unchecked” may pose a risk to stability and secu-
rity,
124
reaffirming the Council’s role and “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”
125
While stopping short of 
making an article 39 threat to the peace determination, it encouraged Mem-
ber States to work with the international community and international or-
ganizations such as the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(“UNAIDS”) to develop “long-term strategies for HIV/AIDS education, 
prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling . . . as part of 
their participation in peacekeeping operations.”
126
In 2011, the Council built
on this earlier effort in addressing HIV’s debilitating impacts on interna-
tional peace and security via Resolution 1983.
127
The Council recognized 
HIV/AIDS as “one of the most formidable challenges to the development 
and stability of societies that required a global response.”
128
In each instance the Council did not find that the HIV/AIDS crisis was 
a direct threat to international peace and security within the meaning of arti-
cle 39, thus activating its Chapter VII authority. But the Council’s willing-
ness to more generally address the HIV/AIDS crisis signaled a continual 
willingness to address underlying threats that destabilize peace and security, 
not unlike the Council’s 1991 recognition that ecological degradation can 
threaten peace and security. Similar to climate change, HIV/AIDS acts as a 
destabilizing force that disproportionately impacts developing nations.  As 
discussed in the Ebola case study below, the Council’s ability to successful-
ly navigate a global health crisis could serve as a roadmap for future climate 
action.
5. The Council and the 2014 Ebola Public Health Crisis: A Potential 
Roadmap for Climate Action?
In the summer of 2014, the lethal Ebola virus rapidly spread through the 
developing world, devastating several West African nations. Thousands 
died. Fear and misinformation spread throughout the region, further under-
mining the crisis. In August 2014, the Presidents of Liberia, Sierra Leone, 





127. See S.C. Res. 1983 (June 7, 2011).
128. Id.
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and Guinea requested that the United Nations take measures to respond to 
the growing Ebola crisis. Shortly thereafter, the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) put in place an “Ebola Response Roadmap” designed to help co-
ordinate the complex international response.  As the Ebola virus cut an in-
creasingly lethal path through Africa, it became clear that additional interna-
tional action was needed to combat the crisis. Shortly thereafter the Council 
acted, declaring that the Ebola outbreak in Africa “constitute[d] a threat to 
international peace and security” within the meaning of article 39.
129
In making a threat to the peace determination, the Council called on all 
Member States to take four specific actions while reserving its most potent 
Chapter VII authority.
130
First, it called on Member States to lift travel and 
border restrictions that were imposed as a result of the Ebola outbreak.
131
Second, it called on nearby Member States to take measures to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian supplies and trained personnel to Ebola-affected 
areas.
132
Third, it called on Member States to actively fight an Ebola-
disinformation campaign in an effort to provide information to the public to 
follow proper health and safety protocols.
133
Fourth, the Council called on 
all Member States to provide urgent resources and equipment to the re-
gion.
134
The Ebola crisis was a fast-moving global health crisis and U.S. leader-
ship under then-President Obama proved critical in galvanizing a Council 
response. Climate change, in contrast, is largely characterized by the slow 
onset of events—such as sea level rise and wave-driven flooding—
punctuated by extreme weather.
135
But there are many similarities and even a direct connection between 
public health threats such as Ebola and climate change. Researchers have 
drawn linkages between environmental factors (such as a changing climate) 
and increased risk to infectious diseases.
136
Similar to climate change’s de-
129. S.C. Res. 2177, ¶ 6 (Sept. 18, 2014) (emphasis added). For an outstanding discus-
sion of the global emergency powers implicated in the Ebola response, see generally J. Benton 
Heath, Global Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2016) (arguing 
that the “expert nature of international bureaucracies fits awkwardly with the political decision 
making required of crisis managers.”).
130. S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 129, ¶¶ 4–7. The Council stopped short of using its most 
robust Chapter VII authorities—such as the military-sponsored delivery of humanitarian assis-
tance under Article 42—to areas particularly hard hit by the Ebola virus. See id.
131. S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 129, ¶ 4.
132. Id. ¶ 5.
133. Id. ¶ 6.
134. Id. ¶ 7. This includes “deployable medical capabilities such as field hospitals with 
qualified and sufficient expertise, staff and supplies, laboratory services, logistical, and 
transport and construction support capabilities . . .”
135. See, e.g., Storlazzi et al., supra note 9. 
136. David W. Redding, Peter M. Atkinson, Andrew A. Cunningham, Gianni Lo Ianoco, 
Lina M. Moses, James L.N. Wood & Kate E. Jones, Impacts on Environmental and Socio-
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stabilizing characteristics, the Council was deeply concerned that Ebola’s 
spread would lead to “civil unrest, social tensions and a deterioration of the 
political and security climate.”
137
Similar to Ebola, security professionals 
illuminate how climate change—a “catalyst for conflict”—can lead to un-
rest and suffering. In its Ebola response, the Council had to navigate other 
international institutions and global health efforts both inside and outside 
the United Nations.
138
The Council’s willingness to address a non-traditional 
security threat while navigating the work of the World Health Organization, 
U.N. stakeholders, and other international organizations suggests that future 
climate action may be within the Council’s zone of competency.
Of course, the Council’s prior willingness to address an increasing 
menu of non-traditional threats is not guaranteed.  For example, witness the 
Council’s sluggish response to the COVID-19 crisis. The Council has not 
(yet) declared the COVID-19 crisis a threat to international peace and secu-
rity.
139
  But this, too, may be changing. In July 2020, the Council addressed 
the novel coronavirus crisis via Resolution 2532, calling for a general and 
immediate cessation of hostilities as the world responds to the novel coro-
navirus crisis. The Council specifically called upon all parties to armed con-
flict to engage in a ninety-day “durable humanitarian pause” to facilitate the 
safe, unhindered and sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance.”
140
Yet 
it is difficult to predict whether the Council’s slow response to COVID-19
signals a broader trend toward retrenchment on global collective action is-
economic Factors on Emergence and Epidemic Potential of Ebola in Africa, NATURE 
COMMC’N (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-12499-6.
137. S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 129, at 1 (“Recognizing that the peacebuilding and de-
velopment gains of the most affected countries concerned could be reversed in light of the 
Ebola outbreak and underlining that the outbreak is undermining the stability of the most af-
fected countries concerned and, unless contained, may lead to further instances of civil unrest, 
social tensions and a deterioration of the political and security climate”) (emphasis added). 
The Ebola crisis also undermined food security, not unlike climate change’s impacts on food 
security. Id. at 3.
138. This included a complex web of actors to include the United Nations General As-
sembly, Economic and Social Council, Peacebuilding Commission, World Health Organiza-
tion, and the broader Global Health Security Agenda. Id. at 3. At the time of S.C. Resolution 
2177’s passage, the Secretary General was planning on convening a meeting to urge an excep-
tional and vigorous response” to Ebola at the sixty-ninth General Assembly. Id. The Council 
also had to navigate the ongoing efforts of several first-line responders such as Doctors With-
out Borders and multinational organizations to include the African Union and Economic 
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”). Id. at 2.
139. See, e.g., Jolie Myers & Ari Shapiro, UN Chief: Security Council Gridlock Blocks 
Effective Coronavirus Response, NPR NEWS, (June 9, 2020, 4:50 PM ET) 
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/06/09/873060941/u-n-chief-
security-council-gridlock-blocks-effective-coronavirus-response. At the time, United Nations 
Secretary-General António Guterres stated “there was no unity around the world in the strate-
gy to fight the pandemic.”  Id.
140. S.C. Res. 2532 (July 1, 2020). And P5 political calculations drive decision-making 
in more traditional use of force security contexts—witness the Council’s complete failure to 
manage the conflict in Syria or find a consensus on the North Korean nuclear threat.  
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sues. Table A provides a snapshot of recent Council responses to effectively 
address non-traditional security threats.
141. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 104, ¶ 16. 
142. S.C. Res. 1308, supra note 122, at 2.
143. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 111, at 1. For background on the Council as global leg-
islator, see Rosand, supra note 110, at 543–44.
144. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 115, at 1.
145. S.C. Res. 1908, supra note 118, ¶¶ 1–2.
146. S.C. Res. 1983, supra note 127, at 1.
147. S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 129, at 1.
148. S.C. Res. 2532, supra note 140.
Table A: Security Council Response to Non-Traditional 
Threats
Date Issue Council Action
1991 Environmental 
damage
Iraq liable for environmental destruction to oil 
fields during the Gulf War.
141
2000 HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS “may pose a risk to stability and 
security” if unchecked.
142
2001 Terrorism Article 39 specifically triggered. “Terrorist acts” 





Article 39 specifically triggered. Spread of 
WMD a threat to international peace and 




Increased security presence following a natural 
disaster.
145
2011 HIV/AIDS Article 39 not triggered.  HIV/AIDS “one of the 
most formidable challenges to the development 




Article 39 specifically triggered.  The Ebola 





COVID-19 “likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security”; Calls upon 
Member States to enact “a general and 
immediate cessation of hostilities in all 
situations.”
148
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B. Security Council Climate Debate & Resolutions: A Stepping-Stone 
for Climate Action?
In addition to the Council’s willingness to address environmental secu-
rity matters and other non-traditional security threats, since 2007 the Coun-
cil has sponsored several high-level forums discussing climate change’s de-
stabilizing effects on international peace and security.
149
Concurrent with 
scientific advances, U.N. leadership has increasingly spoken out about the 
link between climate change and international peace and security.
150
While 
the Council has not yet determined that climate change is a threat to interna-
tional peace and security within the meaning of article 39, it has gradually—
albeit in an ad hoc manner—addressed climate security matters via a variety 
of fora.
151
The Council has examined the linkages between climate change 
and security via an open debate forum four times: April 2007, July 2011, 
July 2018, and January 2019.
152
In 2007, the Council convened its first open debate on climate change 
and security at the initiative of the United Kingdom.
153
This meeting offered 
the first insight into how different states view Council action on climate se-
curity matters, foreshadowing Member nations one day possibly supporting 
broader Council action. From the onset, many Pacific SIDS and many Eu-
ropean Union members argued that the Council should expand its role to 
address climate change’s security implications.
154
Among the P5 members, 
France envisioned a more active role for the Council in line with Resolution 
1625’s call to address the root causes of armed conflict. Meanwhile, the 
United Kingdom argued that the Council should raise awareness on the root 
causes of armed conflict.
155
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the SIDS—
who are at climate change’s frontlines—put forward that the Council had an 
affirmative obligation to address climate change’s devastating effects.
156
The 
island nation of Tuvalu, for example, described climate change as a “con-
149. For a summary of Security Council actions on environmental and climate-related 
matters, see generally Dane Warren, Possible Roles for the UN Security Council in Address-
ing Climate Change, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., July 2015, at 1, 1–5.
150. See, e.g., A More Secure World, supra note 106, ¶ 53.
151. See Warren, supra note 149, at 1–5. 
152. Press Release, Security Council, Climate Change ‘Biggest Threat Modern Humans 
Have Ever Faced’, World-Renowned Naturalist Tells Security Council, Calls for Greater 
Global Cooperation, U.N. Press Release SC/14445 (Feb. 23, 2021).
153. Francesco Sindico, Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?, 1 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 29, 30 (2007).
154. See Warren, supra note 149, at 2. 
155. See Sindico, supra note 153, at 2.
156. Papua New Guinea, a Small Island Developing State, declared that “the impact of 
climate change on small islands was no less threatening than the dangers guns and bombs 
posed to large nations.” Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds First-ever 
Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers, U.N. 
Press Release SC/9000 (Apr. 17, 2007).
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flict . . . not being fought with guns and missiles but with weapons from 
everyday life—chimney stacks and exhaust pipes.”
157
In contrast, China, Russia, and many nations within the Group of 77 
(representing much of the developing world) vocally discouraged any 
Council climate action. In part, this was aligned with historic antipathy to-
ward a greater role for the Council shared by many developing nations. 
They argued that Council climate action encroached on the General Assem-
bly, ECOSOC, and the Framework Convention’s governing mandate.
158
Despite the lack of a cohesive position on Council climate action, the 
Pacific SIDS kept the issue of climate security alive, bringing climate 
change’s adverse impacts before the U.N. General Assembly in 2009. Here, 
the U.N. General Assembly passed a Resolution that both reaffirmed the 
Framework Convention as the “key instrument for addressing climate 
change” while explicitly labeling climate change as a “threat multiplier.”
159
It also called on other U.N. organs to consider climate change’s security im-
plications, leaving the door open for future Council engagement.
160
At the behest of several Pacific island nations and Germany—two con-
sistent cheerleaders for Council climate engagement—the Council spon-
sored its second formal climate-security debate in 2011.
161
This Council-
sponsored debate focused on addressing climate change’s role in rising sea-
levels and food insecurity.
162
Once again, Russia and China  opposed Coun-
cil climate engagement, but the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Ambassador 
Susan Rice, supported a Council climate role as part of the Council’s core 
responsibilities. Further, a divide began to emerge between the Pacific and 
157. Ken Conca, Is There a Role for the UN Security Council on Climate Change?, 61
ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 4, 9 (2019), http://www.tandfonline.com/venv.
158. Id. at 9–10.
159. U.N. Secretary General, Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications, 
¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009).
160. Id. The 2008 U.S. Presidential election signaled an important change in the U.S. 
role and leadership in climate governance. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley, Obama Hails Copenha-
gen Deal as ‘Unprecedented Breakthrough’, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2009), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-dec-19-la-fg-obama-climate19-2009dec19-
story.html. The Copenhagen Accord was near universally adopted in 2009 at the Fifteenth 
Meeting of the Parties (“COP-15”) with President Obama in attendance. Id. This reflected a 
shift in the Framework Convention’s approach to address emissions from both developing and 
developed nations, a source of controversy that led to nations pulling out of the Kyoto Proto-
col. Id.
161. Germany has consistently advocated for a robust Council role to address climate 
change. See, e.g., Mary Lobo & Stefan Talmon, Germany on a Mission: Putting Climate 
Change on the Agenda of the UN Security Council, GERMAN PRAC. INT’L L. (June 15, 2020), 
https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2020/06/germany-on-a-mission-putting-climate-change-on-the-
agenda-of-the-un-security-council. As of this writing, Germany chairs the Council’s rotating 
presidency and has expressed a desire to address climate security matters before the Council. 
Id.  
162. The full transcript of the 2011 debate is available at U.N. SCOR, 66
th
Sess. 6587d 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6587 (July 20, 2011). 
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Caribbean states on Council climate action. Many Caribbean developing na-
tions remained suspicious of the Council wielding greater power while some 
Pacific SIDS welcomed any international action and attention.163 The 2011 
debate concluded with a Presidential Statement that acknowledged climate 
change’s potential to aggravate existing threats to international peace and 
security, while highlighting climate change’s impact on sea-level rise on 
small low-lying island states.
164
In 2017, the Council took the historic step of referencing climate 
change as a destabilizing security impact in a Security Council Resolution. 
In addressing the deteriorating security situation in the Lake Chad region, 
the Council specifically highlighted the “adverse effects of climate change 
and ecological change” in destabilizing the security situation in the Lake 
Chad Basin.
165
The Council followed up in 2018 by recognizing climate 
change’s destabilizing effects on the ongoing conflict in Somalia, Darfur, 
West Africa and the Sahel, and Mali.
166
The Council held its third open debate on climate change in July 2018. 
Member nations proposed a new “Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on Climate and Security” as well as the establishment of an institu-
tional hub for climate-security matters within the United Nations system.
167
The Nigerian U.N. Deputy Secretary General, Amina Mohammed, high-
lighted climate change’s grave threat to African food security, noting that 
the world’s most vulnerable people face the greatest risk of droughts and 
food insecurity.
168
While Russia and China continued their skepticism of 
Council climate engagement, the meeting highlighted another frontline cli-
mate security issue: climate change’s debilitating impacts on food insecurity 
in the African Sahel. The Sahel is one of the poorest regions in the world 
that is uniquely vulnerable to food insecurity and drought—ninety percent 
of the economy is agriculture-based.
169
163. Warren, supra note 149, at 3–4. The Caribbean SIDS diverged from their Pacific 
counterparts in siding with the Group of 77, in part because climate change’s impacts are 
more acutely felt by the Pacific SIDS. Outside the climate change context, the Group of 77 
has been generally skeptical of a greater Council role in international governance. As dis-
cussed infra Part III, all four atoll nations that face extinction reside in the Pacific. Id. 
164. S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/15 (July 20, 2011).
165. S.C. Res. 2349, ¶ 26 (Oct. 14, 2017).
166. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2408 (Mar. 27, 2018). 
167. Security Council Meetings Coverage, United Nations, Addressing Sec. Council, 
Pac. Island President Calls Climate Change Defining Issue of Next Century, Calls for Special 
Representative on Issue (Dec. 17, 2018), www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13417.doc.htm [here-
inafter 2018 Council Debate].
168. Id.
169. Id.
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The Council held its most recent open climate change debate in January 
2019.
170
Here, the U.N. political affairs chief acknowledged that climate-
related disasters are a present-day reality for millions around the globe. Fur-
ther, the debate highlighted the complex relationship between climate-
related risks and conflict, which intersects with political, social, economic, 
and demographic factors. Both the Administrator of the U.N. Development 
Program (“UNDP”) and representatives from the U.N. World Meteorologi-
cal Organization (“WMO”) were in attendance to brief the Council on the 
link between climate and extreme weather.
171
The Council invited the WMO 
to the 2019 debate. The WMO Chief Scientist stated that:
Climate change has a multitude of security impacts—rolling back 
the gains in nutrition and access to food; heightening the risk of 
wildfires and exacerbating air quality challenges; increasing the po-
tential for water conflict; leading to more internal displacement and 
migrations . . . it is increasingly regarded as a national security 
threat.
172
This dialogue between the security and scientific communities repre-
sents a positive step as the Council seeks to better understand climate 
change’s security impacts. These efforts and similar engagement should be 
built upon at future Council-sponsored climate dialogues.
At this most recent debate, the Council’s youth representative specifi-
cally requested a resolution that formally recognized climate change as a 
threat to international peace and security.
173
This 2019 debate stopped short 
of the Council determining that climate change is a “threat to the peace” 
within the meaning of article 39.
174
While this specific request fell short of 
achieving its goal, the 2019 debate demonstrated that a steady, growing core 
group of Member States (seventy were in attendance) are invested in exam-
ining the complex relationship between climate change and security under 
the umbrella of Council leadership.
175
170. See Climate Change Recognized as “Threat Multiplier,” UN Security Council De-
bates Its Impact on Peace, U.N. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01
/1031322.  
171. The U.N. Development Program Administrator called on the Security Council to 
“recognize the science and empirical evidence, leverage all possible measure that can slow 
global warming, and invest in climate adaptation and risk reduction for the millions of people 
already suffering from the effects of climate change.” Id. 
172. Id. (quoting Professor Pavel Kabat, Chief Scientist, UN World Meteorological Or-
ganization).
173. Id.
174. In 2019 concerns over governance issues remained.  See id.  (reporting that “[some] 
Member States believe that this is stepping on the toes of other UN entities, specifically man-
dated with taking a lead on social and economic development, or environmental protection”).
175. In doing so, this “climate-security core” called upon the Security Council to engage 
with the science and empirical evidence while building it capacity for future action. Id. In ad-
dition to the four open debates, the Security Council hosted several more informal “Arria-
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In sum, while these four debates and more informal Council-sponsored 
Arria-Formula
176
meetings on climate are not legally binding, they provide 
the building blocks for a greater potential role for Council climate engage-
ment. Whether this increased Council climate engagement portends substan-
tive follow-on action remains to be seen. But as discussed below, climate 
change’s existential threat to several SIDS virtually ensures that the Council 
will grapple with climate change in some capacity. Table B provides an 
overview of the core Council debates and actions on climate change.
Table B: Key Security Council Climate Change Debates and 
Resolutions177





First formal Council-sponsored climate change 
debate.
178
Russia and China expressed reluctance that the 
Council was the right forum.
July 2011 Second 
Open 
Debate
Initiated by Germany, Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon explicitly declares “climate change a 
threat to international peace and security.”







Recognized climate change’s adverse impacts 
on the stability of the Lake Chad Basin. 
Formula Meetings.” See Climate and Security, July 2020 Monthly Forecast, SEC. COUNCIL 
REP. (June 30, 2020), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-07
/climate-and-security.php. Once again, Russia and China took a stand against any substantive 
Security Council role in addressing climate change, while the Pacific SIDS described climate 
change’s immediate impacts. See id.; Security Challenges for Small Island Developing States,
July 2015 Monthly Forecast, SEC. COUNCIL REP. (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-07
/maintenance_of_international_peace_and_security.php.
176. For a further discussion of these Arria-Formula discussions, see Camilla Born, A 
Resolution for a Peaceful Climate: Opportunities for the UN Security Council, 5 (Stockholm 
Int’l Peace Research Inst., Policy Brief, Jan. 2017), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files
/Resolution-for-peaceful-climate.pdf.
177. This table does not include the Council-sponsored “Arria-Formula” closed debates 
or more informal sessions.  
178. Papua New Guinea, speaking on behalf of the Pacific Small Island and Developing 
States, stated that “the impact of climate change on small islands was no less threatening than 
the dangers of guns and bombs posed to large nations.” See Moztfeldt Kravik, The Security 
Council and Climate Change – Too Hot to Handle?, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 26, 2018) 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-security-council-and-climate-change-too-hot-to-handle/.
179. Because of China and Russia’s insistence that the Council was not the right forum 
for climate change, Presidential Statement was significantly watered down, merely stating that 
“possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing 
threats to international peace and security.” S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/15 (July 20, 2015).  
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Emphasized the need for the U.N. to develop 
adequate risk management strategies.
180
Jan. 2018 Council 
Pres.
Statement
Climate change affecting stability across West 
Africa and Sahel, requiring better risk 
assessment and risk management strategies. 
June 2018 Resolution 
2423
Climate change’s negative effects acknowledged 
in Mali’s security situation.
July 2018 Third Open 
Debate
Nauru President declared “climate change the 
defining issue of the next century.”
Calls for an “institutional hub” for climate 
security matters and a Special Representative on 
Climate & Security; renewed focus on African 
food insecurity.
181
July 2018 Resolution 
2408
Extended mandate of U. N. Mission in Somalia 
while recognizing “the adverse effects of 
climate change, ecological changes, and natural 
disasters . . . on the stability of Somalia.”
182
July 2018 Resolution 
2429
Climate change’s negative effects acknowledged 
in Darfur.
Jan. 2019 Fourth Open 
Debate
183
Climate change recognized as a “threat 
multiplier” by scientists.
184
Youth resolution for the Council to recognize 
climate change as a “threat to international 
peace and security” falls short.
180. S.C. Res. 2349, supra note 165, ¶ 26. Lake Chad has shrunk by more than ninety
percent since the 1960s, impacting 45 million people. The relevant text states, 
[The Security Council] recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and 
ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including 
water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and 
emphases the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by 
governments and the United Nations relating to these factors.
181. 2018 Council Debate, supra note 167.
182. S.C. Res. 2408, supra note 166.  In addition, S.C. Resolution 2408 reiterated its 
continued concern “at the high number of refugees and internally displaced person, including 
persons newly displaced by the drought.” Id. ¶ 25.
183. This meeting was initiated by the Dominican Republic, at the time a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council.  See Stella Schaller & Benjamin Pohl, Security Council De-
bates How Climate Disasters Threaten International Peace and Security, WILSON CTR.: NEW 
SEC. BEAT (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2019/02/security-council-
debates-climate-disasters-threaten-international-peace-security.
184. See Climate Change Recognized as “Threat Multiplier,” UN Security Council De-
bates Its Impact on Peace, supra note 170.  
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C. Nation Extinction: A Growing International Climate Governance 
Gap
How might Council climate engagement be accelerated beyond debates 
and forums? In what follows, I analyze possible pathways for future Council 
climate action. Of course, a “green swan” event such as the breaking off of 
the East Antarctic ice sheet or sudden polar ice cap melting—resulting in 
massive global sea level rise—could spur immediate Council action.
185
Such an apocalyptic “Climate 9/11” event could spark the Council to over-
come gridlock, not unlike the Council’s sweeping action on terrorism in the 
aftermath of the September 11
th
attacks.
But regardless of a future green swan event, two forthcoming global 
climate report cards will continue to pressurize Council action and atten-
tion.
186
First, the widening emissions gap will be highlighted in the IPCC 
Sixth IPCC Assessment, scheduled for 2022. The Sixth Assessment is wide-
ly anticipated to paint a bleak picture of collective GHG emissions, building 
off its 2018 “Global Warming of 1.5 Celsius” Report that highlighted the 
ten-year window to massively reduce global emissions.
187
Second, the Paris 
Accord’s first comprehensive “global stocktake” is set to take place in 2023 
(with a second one to follow in 2028). As of this writing, the global stock-
take is anticipated to fall far short of expectations, thus ensuring a continual 
international spotlight on our widening emissions gap.
188
Climate-driven environmental deterioration will continue to display the 
terrifying consequences of the world’s collective failure to address our col-
lective GHG emissions gap. The emissions gap will continue to manifest 
itself in a vivid and violent manner through increased violent unrest, cli-
mate-drive migration and conflict.
189
And as discussed below, the stakes as-
sociated with the threat of nation extinction will continue to force climate 
change on the Council’s agenda regardless of political preferences and 
Council paralysis.
185. In a recent scientific study, National Geographic reported that an ice sheet collapse 
in East Antarctica ice sheet (holding more than 80 percent of the Earth’s water) is much closer 
to collapse than previously thought. See Charlotte Hartley, Antarctic Ice Sheet Collapse Could 
Add 3 Meters to Sea-Level Rise, SCI. MAG. (Jul. 23, 2020) https://www.sciencemag.org/news
/2020/07/antarctic-ice-sheet-collapse-could-add-3-metres-sea-level-rise.  For a discussion of 
the black swan effect, see NASSIM TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2010). The term “green swan”
pertains to an unprecedented environmental event.
186. Literature, too, can play a powerful role in raising consciousness about collective 
action problems.  See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962) (documenting the 
widespread use of pesticides, helping to spark a grassroots environmental movement).
187. NCA 2018, supra note 2. 
188. See The Paris Agreement, Five Years Later: What Research Says About Future Di-
rections, ENERGY INNOVATIONS (Dec. 17, 2020), https://energyinnovation.org/2020/12/17
/the-paris-agreement-five-years-later-what-research-says-about-future-directions.
189. See generally Campbell & Parthemore, supra note 7.
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Climate change dramatically exacerbates sea level rise, wave-driven 
flooding, and extreme weather.
190
Indeed, scientists predict that four island 
nations—Kiribati, Maldives, Republic of Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu—
will be uninhabitable by mid-century.
191
Climate change will force full-scale 
abandonment of their homeland,
192
raising the specter of imminent nation 
extinction.
193
Despite their small physical size, economies, and populations, 
SIDS have equal standing with other U.N. Member States. We must begin 
to address climate impacts on small island developing states now. Delaying 
action today presents climate opportunity costs as the emissions gap widens 
and climate impacts become more pronounced.
The island climate migrants’ plight also shines a light on another inter-
national governance gap outside the Framework Convention that will grow 
in importance. The World Refugee Convention is silent on migrants fleeing
environmental disaster. And the Framework Convention and follow-on ac-
cords do not directly provide legal protections for climate migrants fleeing 
environmental or imminent climate disaster.
194
While SIDS lack a permanent seat on the Security Council, their influ-
ence and governance voice are growing.
195
As a group, SIDS comprise ap-
proximately twenty percent of all U.N. members and have recently been a 
driving force behind the Council’s climate-security debates and discus-
sions.
196
SIDS and other neighboring, poor, low-lying states overwhelmingly 
lack the capacity to address climate impacts via traditional climate adapta-
tion measures such as investment in climate resilient infrastructure.
197
For 
these small island nations, climate change poses an immediate, existential 
threat. This virtually ensures that climate–security matters will remain ac-
tive in the international public discourse.
198
190. See id. at 19.
191. For a discussion of the challenges facing the Marshall Islands, see generally J. 
Chris Larson, Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the Marshall Islands, 21 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 495 (2000). 
192. Storlazzi et al., supra note 9, at 1.
193. Conca et al., supra note 110, at 11 (highlighting that the specter of “stateless” U.N. 
Member States raises complex legal and political questions around sovereignty). 
194. In finding a threat to international peace and security in the 1998 Kosovo crisis, the 
UN Security Council previously recognized that the massive flow of refugees contributed to a 
deteriorating security situation.  S. C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998).
195. Of the Security Council’s ten non-permanent members, one seat is filled by the 
Asia Pacific Regional Group, Vietnam. See Current Members | United Nations Security 
Council, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2021).
196. See, e.g., 2018 Council Debate, supra note 167. The Pacific SIDS are part of the 
Asia-Pacific Group, comprised of fifty-three Member States in Asia and Oceania.  
197. See generally Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J.
165 (2008).
198. Complicating matters, the Pacific Small Island Developing States have differed 
from the Caribbean Small Island Developing States in seeking Security Council action.  The 
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Indeed, the specter of “stateless” U.N. Member States strikes at the 
heart of the U.N. Charter-system. The U.N. Charter upholds the principle of 
sovereignty and the sovereign equality of each Member nation.
199
The 
Council, in turn, plays a central, stabilizing role in upholding each nation’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Council’s responsibility and man-
date to address all matters of international peace and security suggest that 
the Council cannot avoid addressing climate-driven nation extinction with-
out paying some external cost to its own legitimacy.
While climate change’s impact on these island nations favors an equita-
ble solution, this outcome very much remains in doubt and remains subject 
to the whims of “political expediency.”
200
In the following sections, I pro-
vide more specificity on the challenges and opportunities of a new “Cli-
mate-Security Council.”
IV. A Climate-Security Council: Challenges & Opportunities 
For Action
What are the challenges facing a re-conceptualized Climate-Security 
Council? Skeptics of any Council action already recoil against its top-down, 
anti-democratic approach. Exacerbating matters, developing countries lack a 
permanent seat at the Council’s table but stand to face the brunt of climate 
change’s impacts.
201
But upon closer inspection, one may see an opportunity 
for Council climate action that is consistent with its understood mandate. If 
the Council can deftly navigate core legitimacy challenges and align its 
work with ongoing international climate efforts, it can play a substantive 
and important role today that is in accord with its expertise and governing 
mandate. Indeed, a fully engaged “Climate-Security Council” reinforces and 
upholds the Council’s historic role in maintaining international peace and 
security.
202
I turn to the challenges and opportunities behind any Council 
climate action below.
Caribbean Small Island Developing States has previously endorsed the Group of 77 (“G77”)
opinion that the Council must “refrain from encroaching on the functions and powers that the 
Charter and tradition have placed within the purview of the General Assembly.” Conca et al., 
supra note 110, at 11.
199. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1. The United Nations is “based upon the principle of the sov-
ereign equality of all its Members.” Id. ¶ 1.
200. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 201 cmt. A (Am. Law Inst. 1985). 
201. In part because of this concern, many G77 developing nations have been reluctant 
to endorse any Security Council role in addressing climate change.  See Statement of Behalf of 
the Group of 77 and China by Ambassador John Ashe, Permanent Representative of Antigua 
and Barbuda to the United Nations, at the Thematic Debate of the General Assembly on “Ad-
dressing Climate Change: The United Nations and the World at Work,” GROUP 77 (Feb. 12, 
2008), https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=080212.
202. See U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶¶ 1–2.
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A. Challenge: Climate Change is Outside the Security Council’s 
Competence and Jurisdictional Mandate
There are six principal organs within the United Nations: the Council, 
ECOSOC, General Assembly, Trusteeship Council, ICJ, and a Secretariat.
203
ECOSOC and the United Nations Environmental Program are the U.N. enti-
ties most heavily focused on environmental matters while the General As-
sembly and ECOSOC have historically shared responsibility over climate 
change and sustainable development goals.
204
The Charter is silent on where, exactly, environmental matters reside. 
This is not at all surprising: The Charter was drafted in the wake of World 
War II, well before the environmental awakening and a full understanding 
of climate change’s impacts came into focus.
205
In turn, the 1992 UNFCCC 
and follow-on agreements have served as the central international legal 
mechanisms to address global climate change, but at some point, they over-
lap with the Council’s authority on security matters.
206
Any future Council action on climate must also take into account its 
complex seventy-five-year history.  Irrespective of prospective climate ac-
tion, the legitimacy of Council actions—particularly in its exercise of its 
Chapter VII authorities—has been a core concern since the UN Charter’s 
inception. Developing nations within the Group of 77 have routinely criti-
cized the Council’s anti-democratic nature and its closed, static membership 
since 1945.
207
Irrespective of climate change, there is wariness of the Coun-
cil taking on too large a role within international governance. Indeed, an 
overly robust Council climate agenda that generates binding legal obliga-
tions on all Member nations risks causing a climate backlash.
208
This shines 
light on historical critiques that the Council is an anti-democratic institution 
that is further straying from its core mandate.
209
Complicating any legitimacy analysis, the Council is comprised of the 
worst climate offenders—a point routinely made by developing nations. The 
P5 accounts for the majority of the world’s GHG emissions, undermining 
the Council’s credibility to address climate change.
210
Any Council climate 
203. Id. art. 7, ¶ 1.
204. See, e.g., Climate Security 2009, supra note 8.
205. The Charter is also difficult to amend. See U.N. Charter art. 108.
206. Framework Convention, supra note 21; Climate Security 2009, supra note 8, para. 
4. The resolution also noted the respective responsibilities of the principal U.N. organs. Cli-
mate Security 2009, supra note 8, para. 3.
207. Warren, supra note 149, at 3.
208. See Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Deadlock on Addressing Climate Shift, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 20, 2011. 
209. Ash Murphy, Climate Change Is a Security Threat, So Where Is the Security Coun-
cil?, CONVERSATION (May 15, 2018), https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-a-
security-threat-so-where-is-the-un-security-council-96658.
210. China produces the most GHG emissions of any one nation on an annual basis and 
the United States is the world’s largest historic emitter of GHG emissions. The United States 
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action is subject to the normal political constraints by the P5 and non-
permanent members.
211
As such, the P5 may already be institutionally disin-
centivized to take forward-looking climate mitigation measures that may 
harm their economies. But the political and institutional incentives centered 
around climate mitigation measures may well act as a silver lining, disen-
tangling the Council from the Framework Convention’s core mitigation ef-
forts. This will drive the Council to focus its efforts on security matters and 
addressing mitigation with precise action.
212
The Council’s slow response in addressing the ongoing COVID-19 
global health crisis showcases the difficulty in rallying Council action 
around complex international collective action problems.
213
Unlike the 
Council’s approach to the Ebola crisis, the Council has not (yet) declared 
the coronavirus crisis a threat to international peace and security, but it has 
taken the remarkable step of calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities 
as the world grapples with the pandemic.
214
But the COVID-19 crisis arose 
unexpectedly, requiring the Council to act overnight to harness a complex 
global response. In contrast, the climate crisis has been simmering for dec-
ades. There is an existing international governance infrastructure and scien-
tific community already at work, laying the groundwork for action.
In sum, underlying Council legitimacy and political economy problems 
must be taken seriously. Any Council effort to address climate change must 
first proceed with due regard for the rights and economic realities of devel-
oping nations and the Framework Convention and other international cli-
mate efforts.
215
As it dips its toes into the climate waters, the Council should 
has recently publicly stated that natural disasters causing widespread displacement should be 
within the Council’s ambits. Press Release, Security Council, Addressing Security Council, 
Pacific Island President Calls Climate Change Defining Issue of Next Century, Calls for Spe-
cial Representative on Issue, U.N. Press Release SC/13417 (July 11, 2018) [hereinafter U.N. 
Security Council Press Release].
211. A complete discussion of the political economy and decision-making of the Council 
is beyond the scope of this paper. For a fuller discussion of the constraints, restraints, and in-
centives of Council decision-making, see Conca et al., supra note 110.
212. Security Council action to assist developing nations is consistent with the core in-
ternational law principle of common but differentiated responsibilities between developed and 
developing nations.  Common but differentiated responsibilities is a core international envi-
ronmental law principle as set forth in the Rio Declaration and the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.  See Framework Convention, supra note 21, art. 3(1). 
213. The current U.N. Secretary General has called the coronavirus pandemic “the most 
challenging crisis since the [United Nations] founding.” U.N., Responding to the Socio-
Economic Impacts of COVID-19 - UN Chief, YOUTUBE (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=etxjLz7eRU4.
214. S.C. Res. 2532, supra note 140, ¶ 2; see Rick Gladstone, U.N. Leader Describes 
Grave Threat, but the Security Council is Mum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2020, at A5. The General 
Assembly has also addressed the current coronavirus crisis, adopting a resolution expressing 
support for a strong, unified response to the coronavirus pandemic. Yet the General Assembly 
lacks the broader security and enforcement mandate enjoyed by the Security Council.  
215. Framework Convention, supra note 21, art. 3(1) (“The Parties should protect the 
climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
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strive to be in sync with ongoing climate efforts, playing a substantive role 
that is aligned with its core expertise and mandate.
B. Opportunity: Adapting an Institutional Risk Allocation Framework 
for Climate Change
The UNFCCC and its follow-on climate accords have gradually ex-
panded their scope beyond addressing exclusively climate mitigation 
measures. Complex security questions—such as how the international 
community should address the rising number of climate migrants—have yet 
to be addressed by the Framework Convention or other international gov-
erning bodies. The Council alone holds that special mandate. Indeed, the 
landmark 2015 Paris Climate Accord is silent on climate change’s adverse 
effects on international peace and security, with only a brief mention of 
food security.
216
Further, in the unlikely event that all the Paris Climate Ac-
cord’s mitigation commitments are met, climate change will still massively 
disrupt international peace and security. As the emissions gap expands, the 
security implications will be extraordinary, particularly in the developing 
world. Devastating climate realities will force us to adopt a legal entrepre-
neurship mindset—using existing legal tools in new and innovative ways—
in solving the climate security crisis.
Security matters are not within the General Assembly and ECOSOC’s 
mandate, and the Paris Agreement does not squarely address climate securi-
ty matters.
217
Previously, the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change found what amounts to an “implementation gap” in 
environmental treaties between what is written as a legal obligation and how 
those environmental obligations are implemented and enforced.
218
Such trea-
ties are “undermined by inadequate implementation and enforcement by the 
Member States.”
219
Relying upon the Framework Convention, ECOSOC, and the General 
Assembly alone to provide the international legal framework to address cli-
mate change ignores stark security realities.  Climate change is a “super-
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”). 
216. The Paris Climate Accord does state that there is a “need for an effective and pro-
gressive response to the urgent threat of climate change . . .” Paris Agreement, supra note 3,
pmbl. (emphasis provided). Under Article 8(4), the Paris Agreement identifies areas of coop-
eration to include emergency preparedness, early warning, risk management and slow onset 
events. Id. art. 8(4). The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage is the 
UNFCCC-mechanism to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of cli-
mate change.  Id. art. 8(3).
217. Of note, the Paris Climate Accord does not address security concerns directly, re-
ferring only to the problem of climate change’s impact on food security as one of its adverse 
impacts and highlights the need for “an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat 
of climate change.” See id. pmbl.; see also Nevitt, supra note 105.
218. A More Secure World, supra note 106.
219. Id.
564 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:527
wicked problem” with massively destabilizing security effects.
220
In the face 
of massively disruptive climactic change, I propose an “institutional risk al-
location” approach that considers the respective competencies of all relevant 
international organs, including the Council.
221
An institutional risk allocation approach better allocates governance 
risk across a wide spectrum of competent international institutions and gov-
ernance frameworks. As such, the Council can play a legal gap-filling role 
that complements the concurrent efforts of the Framework Convention and 
other international climate efforts. Even in the best-case scenario—the Unit-
ed States rejoins the Paris Accord in 2021 and global emissions begin a 
steady march downward—past GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for 
decades, thus ensuring a steady increase in global temperatures and climate 
disruption. Advances in climate science and climate change’s corresponding 
impacts on international peace and security make clear that we must take 
massive action to both lower our GHG emissions and prepare for climate 
change’s destabilizing effects today.
222
Of course, the Council may never be the central venue to address cli-
mate change’s multivariate impacts. But each day of delay presents enor-
mous climate opportunity costs that must be taken into account. They will 
increasingly be felt by SIDS and poorer, developing nations that are most 
vulnerable to climate change’s effects. Irrespective of Council action, ef-
forts must be intensified across all relevant U.N. organs.
223
Doing so is con-
sistent with past Council practice and the role envisioned by earlier Council 
efforts to adopt a broad strategy of conflict prevention.
224
The Council plays 
the central role in the maintenance of international peace and security.
225
Implicit in this mandate is upholding and protecting the sovereign equality 
of all Member States from all threats, however defined.
C. Principles for Council Climate Action
Prior to taking any Council action on climate, I propose three principles 
that the Council should follow, with a brief discussion of how this might 
work in practice.
220. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 1160.  
221. The United States’ announcement that it intends to walk away from the Paris Ac-
cord showcases the danger of the over-reliance on putting all our eggs in one “climate basket.”
222. See, e.g., IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 2; see also WALLACE-WELLS, supra note 
71 (summarizing the leading scientific evidence governing climate change).
223. Climate Security 2009, supra note 8, para. 9 (1). 
224. S.C. Res. 1625, supra note 17, pmbl.
225. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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1. Work in Governance Harmony with Ongoing International Climate 
Efforts
First, the Council must act in “governance harmony” with an increas-
ingly complex web of international climate efforts, scientific advances, and 
legal frameworks. As a legal matter, the Council does not have to take a 
backseat to other international agreements—the Council’s authority is 
preeminent—but a governance harmony approach should initially be fol-
lowed to bolster the legitimacy and acceptability of Council climate action.
We already have a potential climate governance overlap between the 
Paris Climate Accord and the Council. For example, the Paris Climate Ac-
cord has a loss and damage provision that relates to the Council’s security 
mandate.
226
This loss and damage provision specifies several possible areas 
for cooperation to include emergency preparedness, slow onset events, and 
community resilience.
227
Yet it remains unclear how the loss and damage 
measures will be fully implemented and incorporated within the existing 
Framework Convention structure. Taking a “governance harmony” ap-
proach disfavors Council action on matters that are already being addressed 
by the Framework Convention, such as mandating that the Paris Accord’s 
provisions be followed. But harmonizing the Council with existing efforts 
leaves substantial room for Council action. This could include addressing 
particularly pernicious climate activities from climate rogue states and as-
sisting developing nations with climate adaptation investment and aid.
The Council’s response to the Ebola health crisis may offer some in-
sights in navigating existing governance efforts. Professors Dena Adler and 
Daniel Esty have analogized climate change to public health threats, arguing 
that a multi-tiered governance approach is required to both pandemics and 
climate governance.
228
After all, both climate change and public health 
threats require coordinated, international action and goal setting. Professor 
Esty argues that the Framework Convention has structural shortcomings 
where “climate change could demonstrate the value of a new international 
legal architecture for the twenty-first century . . .”
229
Thankfully, the Ebola 
crisis abated shortly after the Council acted, and a multi-tiered governance 
approach was not required. But one could imagine a scenario where the 
Council—having already declared the Ebola crisis a threat to the peace—
would seek to take more prescriptive measures in response to a worldwide 
health epidemic.
226. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8.
227. Id. art. 8(4). Under the loss and damage report, “Parties recognize the importance of 
averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sus-
tainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.” Id. art. 8(1).
228. Dena P. Adler & Daniel C. Esty, Changing International Law for a Changing Cli-
mate, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 279, 281, 283 (2018).
229. Id. at 284.
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2. Striking a Legitimacy Balance Between Action & Inaction
Second, any Council action must attempt to strike a “legitimacy bal-
ance” where the Council must act in accordance with both its understood 
area of expertise while not shirking away from its responsibilities for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Critics of any prospective 
Council climate action will assert that the Council is overstepping its man-
date, and climate change is best left to the ECOSOC and the Framework 
Convention. Within the Council, both Russia and China have leveled those 
critiques. The Council must ultimately find the right “Goldilocks” approach 
that walks a precarious “legitimacy tightrope” between action and inaction.
While the Council has broad authority to take action, it must act in ac-
cordance with the “Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” in dis-
charging its duties.
230
In taking proactive measures to safeguard the nations 
facing existential crisis, the Council is upholding the principle of sovereign-
ty in accordance with these core U.N. Charter principles.
231
Under custom-
ary international law predating the U.N. Charter, states are prohibited from 
knowingly allowing their territory to cause harm to other states.
232
If the 
Council cannot save nations from the scourge of climate change, this may 
undermine the Council’s legitimacy in maintaining international peace and 
security. Climatizing the Council breathes life into the Council’s role in pro-
tecting the sovereign equality of all its members.
3. Define Climate Change’s Causes and Security Effects with Precision
Third, the Council must take the necessary steps to define both climate 
change’s contributing causes and impacts with precision. After all, climate 
change is caused by a wide variety of human activity, but some activities are 
particularly harmful—the creation of new coal-fired power plants and de-
forestation efforts in Brazil and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are 
two examples of egregious climate behavior. While declaring climate 
change a threat to international peace and security may raise international 
awareness, it could engender follow-on paralysis if the precise impacts are 
not defined with sufficient clarity and understanding. By focusing on a clear 
linkage between climate change and its tangible impacts, the Council could 
230. U.N. Charter art. 2.
231. U.N. Charter art. 2(1).  
232. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1936 (1941).  The 
Trail Smelter principle is reiterated in the Framework Convention on Climate Change: “States 
have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of international 
law. . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction.” Framework Convention, supra note 21, para. 8.
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fashion a more precise and actionable remedy that bolsters the credibility of 
the action.
233
V. Recommendations for Security Council Action On Climate
Change
In the following sections, I offer six specific recommendations for the 
Council to take on climate security, arguing that the Council should affirma-
tively determine that climate change is a threat to international peace and 
security under article 39.
234
Doing so is aligned with earlier Council efforts 
to address the underlying cause of threats to international peace and securi-
ty. It also reflects a mature acknowledgement that climate change destabi-
lizes human security and unlocks the Council’s awesome Chapter VII au-
thorities. If this is politically untenable, the Council should take the initial 
step—similar to its COVID-19 response—to declare that climate change is 
likely to endanger international peace and security.235 At the very least, the 
Council must remain engaged on climate security matters.
Outside of a threat to the peace determination, there are several actions 
that the Council should take today. If the Council political paralysis takes 
over, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and climate activists alike should welcome and advocate for continual 
Council climate engagement to close the governance gap.
A. Recommendations for Council Climate Action Outside of a Threat to 
the Peace Determination
1. Synchronize Council Climate Efforts with the Framework 
Convention’s Work
First, the Council should build upon its efforts to host high-level discus-
sions on climate security matters that are within its zone of competence and 
mandate. International organizations and non-governmental organizations 
should push for continued Council climate engagement, and the Conference 
of Parties (“COP”) should embrace a Council role on climate security mat-
ters. Right now, Council climate discussions occur in an ad hoc, reactive 
manner, and are highly dependent on who holds the Council Presidency. At 
a minimum, Council-led climate security discussions and forum should take 
233. To be sure, in the United States and elsewhere, there is a vocal climate-denial 
community that dismisses human activity and anthropogenic climate change. Scholars such as 
Wharton’s Professor Sarah Light have argued that linking climate change with national securi-
ty may assist in bridging a highly partisan issue. See Sarah Light, Valuing National Security: 
Climate Change, the Military, and Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1772 (2014). For a similar ar-
gument, see Mark P. Nevitt, On Environmental Law, Climate Change and National Security, 
44 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.  321 (2020).
234. U.N. Charter art. 39.
235. S.C. Res. 2532, supra note 140 (emphasis provided).
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place in a more systematic manner. It makes sense to synchronize all cli-
mate efforts in coordination with the Framework Convention, the work of 
the IPCC, and broader scientific community. In a hopeful sign, the Council 
invited the WMO to its January 2019 climate open debate.  Such science-
security dialogues should be built upon.
Thankfully, the COP already meets annually in accordance with article 
7 of the Framework Convention.
236
Why not establish follow-on “Security-
COPs” that could tap into the Council’s expertise and authority? These Se-
curity COPs should work in governance harmony with the Framework Con-
vention.
237
Doing so will facilitate information flow and allow the Frame-
work Convention members to pose climate-security questions and issues 
directly to the Council. This allows the Council to be better integrated and 
placed within the central international climate governance process. It also 
alleviates concerns that the Council is encroaching on the work of other 
U.N. organs—a “Climate-Security COP” reaffirms the Framework Conven-
tion’s central role in international climate governance while tapping into 
Council expertise and authorities.
Regardless of the precise manner that future Council climate engage-
ment unfolds, it should be open, transparent, routine, and integrated within 
existing governance efforts. Climate response measures—to include climate 
change’s security impacts—have yet to be fully addressed within the 
Framework Convention’s body of work, leaving ample space for Council 
action and input.
238
As nations report on their emissions reductions via rou-
tine global stocktakes under the Paris Agreement, we will be better able to 
assess our collective progress (or failure) to keep our GHG emissions below 
the critical two-degree Celsius threshold. A follow-on “Security COP” 
would also provide enough periodicity to shine light on what nations are 
falling short of their commitments to reduce GHG emissions and would en-
gage with the most recent climate science.
In sum, by remaining seized of climate change in a systematic and rou-
tine way, the Council can facilitate information sharing, bring in its own ex-
pertise, and fuse the latest national security, intelligence, and scientific ex-
pertise on climate. It would also likely build trust across governance 
structures.  Follow on Security COPs can help inform the Council follow-on 
actions, setting the stage for future potential enforcement measures.
236. The next COP is scheduled for Glasgow, Scotland in 2021.  “. . . ordinary sessions 
of the Conference of the Parties shall be held every year unless otherwise decided by the Con-
ference of the Parties.” Framework Convention, supra note 21, art. 7(4).
237. Alternatively, Council climate discussions could follow the release of key IPCC 
climate reports. The Sixth Climate Assessment is scheduled to be released in 2022. Doing so 
would also eliminate the need for a second round of air travel, sending a message about the 
importance of reducing GHG emissions.
238. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, para. 10. The Paris Accord already references cli-
mate change’s adverse effects on food security and hunger, an issue that directly relates to the 
Security Council’s work.
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2. The Council Should Adopt Ex Ante, Risk-Based Measures on 
Climate Security
Second, the Council should also play a greater role, ex ante, in address-
ing the role that climate change will have in future conflicts. The Council 
has recently demonstrated a willingness to address climate change’s adverse 
effects within existing Council Resolutions in the context of violent conflict 





resolutions should not shy away from making similar pronouncements ex 
ante, outside of active conflict, highlighting future areas where there is a 
clear linkage between climate change and security matters (e.g. food and 
water security).
241
In taking such ex ante measures, the Council could play 
an important, early-warning role in addressing climate-related conflict pre-
vention by coordinating climate security concerns across U.N. organs. This 
could potentially include the development of an early climate warning sys-
tem or the formal development and incorporation of climate change into 
United Nations planning and strategy.
242
The Security Council should also build upon its earlier efforts to 
squarely address climate change’s impacts in Council resolutions and re-
ports. Climate change has been briefly referenced in Council resolutions 
since 2017. But a single, climate change-focused resolution would elevate 
climate change on the international agenda and highlight the widespread 
connection between conflict and climate change. This is aligned with the 
Council’s historic role in taking action to prevent conflicts and a renewed 
recognition of the need to address the root cause of armed conflict.
243
Relatedly, the Council should establish an early warning information-
sharing “clearinghouse” system or institutional home to assist the U.N. in 
responding to climate crisis.
244
Such a system could help identify the emer-
gent “climate hotspots,” facilitating the U.N.’s ability to deliver aid and re-
sources rapidly. Council action could be further expanded, for example, to 
address the unique climate security challenges outside of “hot” conflict 
zones, such as the climate impacts felt by small island nations. The Council 
could invest in better risk assessment tools, resources, information sharing, 
and strategies. Why not adopt a proactive, risk-based approach, rather than 
waiting for disaster and conflict to strike?
239. S.C. Res. 2349, supra note 37, ¶ 26.
240. S.C. Res. 2408, supra note 166, pmbl.
241. For a similar argument, see Kravik, supra note 178.
242. Conca et al., supra note 15, at 11.  
243. S.C. Res. 1625, supra note 17, pmbl.
244. Karl Mathiesen & Natalie Sauer, UN Security Council Members Mount New Push 
to Address Climate Threat, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/01/25/un-security-council-members-mount-new-
push-address-climate-threat.
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Of course, a proactive Council on climate change requires political will. 
But doing so acknowledges the existing scientific evidence that ties climate 
change to deteriorating security situations. The Council should work with 
leading IPCC, climate scientists and the proposed “Security COPs” to high-
light climate change’s security implications and move resources to future 
climate hotspots.
245
3. Employ the Council’s Chapter VI Investigatory Authorities
Third, the Council should turn to its Chapter VI investigatory powers to 
investigate climate change’s impacts on developing nations, to include the 
four atoll nations facing imminent climate danger. Under Chapter VI, the 
Council can investigate any situation that may endanger the maintenance of 
peace and security.
246
For example, the Council could investigate and apply 
resources to the SIDS climate crisis, address the scope and scale of food se-
curity hotspots, or changing, climate–driven migration patterns. In exercis-
ing its investigatory authority, the Council could work with other interna-
tional institutions in developing options for the citizens of these atoll 
nations.
As it relates to the small island crisis, I envision two ways that this 
comes before the Council.  First, under article 99, the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral “may bring to the Security Council any matter which in his opinion 
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”
247
Alter-
natively, under article 35, any Member nation can bring any dispute to the 
Council (or General Assembly) “which might lead to international friction 
or give rise to a dispute.”
248
This provides the legal pathway for the plight 
of these island nations to be formally placed before the Council.
249
Consider a realistic scenario that draws upon the Council’s article VI 
investigatory authorities. Under article 35, the Republic of the Marshall Is-
lands requests that the Council investigate climate change’s impacts on the 
loss of its territory and other core habitability-related concerns.
250
The 
Council decides to investigate the scope and scale of the crisis, turning to 
245. For example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a report ac-
knowledging the global human security challenge posed by climate change. See, e.g., COATS,
supra note 29, at 21–23.  
246. U.N. Charter art. 34 (emphasis added). 
247. U.N. Charter art. 99. 
248. U.N. Charter art. 35 (referencing art. 34).
249. See U.N. Charter art. 35. Recall that in the Security Council’s response to the Ebola 
crisis, the Presidents of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea requested that the UN Secretary 
General take action to coordinate and respond to the Ebola outbreak. S.C. Res. 2177, supra 
note 129, para. 9.  In September 2011, Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands an-
nounced plans to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice to deter-
mine “whether state have obligations under international law to ensure activities in their terri-
tory do not harm other states.” Davies & Riddell, supra note 18, at 69–70.  
250. U.N. Charter art. 35, ¶ 1.
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the world’s leading climate scientists, policymakers, academics, and others 
with expertise in addressing climate impacts at developing nations. This sci-
ence-based investigation would be Council-led but could collaborate with 
IPCC scientists, other international governance entities, and academic insti-
tutions. The Council may take a page from the Ebola playbook to call on 
Member nations to assist the most vulnerable island nations in adapting to 
climate change. This could take many forms—the Council could call on 
Member nations to offer aid and assistance, accept vulnerable populations 
into their own population, or even ask the worse climate offenders to carve 
out territory for these new climate migrants.
251
Alternatively, the Council could investigate the extent of dangerous 
climate activities that have a particular devastating impact on peace and se-
curity. Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s failure to enforce environmental 
regulations is one likely candidate, although there are many others. The in-
vestigation’s conclusions would highlight the scope of the climate destruc-
tion and provide the impetus for follow-on enforcement action.
At the Chapter VI investigation’s conclusion, the Council could rec-
ommend concrete steps that Member nations should take to assist the Mar-
shall Islands.
252
For example, the Council could call on nations to assist the 
Marshall Islands financially or through the provision of scientific or tech-
nical expertise. Nevertheless, such action could raise awareness of the plight 
of atoll nations and, more importantly, serve as a building block for future 
action.
253
The Council’s earlier response to the Ebola crisis may serve as a
helpful playbook, as it called upon Member nations to assist in aid and sup-
port to vulnerable nations suffering the worst consequences of the outbreak.
Chapter VI’s soft law approach works hand in glove with Chapter VII’s 
powerful and legally binding tools that are always at the Council’s disposal. 
Indeed, merely keeping alive the possibility a Council article 39 determina-
tion may serve as a prod for international action—a successful strategy in 
other contexts.
254
As discussed below, making a threat to the peace determi-
nation would highlight climate change’s threat to the international commu-
nity and would be aligned with prior Council efforts to address non-
traditional, underlying threats to international peace and security.
251. This idea was proposed by Professor Michael Gerrard of Columbia Law School’s
Sabin Climate Center.  See Michael Gerrard, America is the Worst Polluter in the History of 




252. Some scholars have intimated in other contexts that Chapter VI measures can be 
binding.  See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolu-
tions Are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?, 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 270, 275 (1972). 
253. See CAMILLA BORN, A RESOLUTION FOR A PEACEFUL CLIMATE: OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (Jan. 2017).
254. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government 
in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 373 (2011).
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B. Recommendations for Council Climate Action Via an Article 39 
Threat to the Peace Determination
In what follows, I argue that the Council should declare climate change 
a threat to international peace and security, squarely elevating climate 
change and its security impacts before the Council and setting the stage for 
broader Chapter VII enforcement action.
1. Affirmatively Declare Climate Change a Threat to International 
Peace & Security Under Article 39
In light of the overwhelming science and dire predictions of our desta-
bilized climate century, the Council should formally declare climate change 
a threat to international peace and security.
255
In the event of Council paraly-
sis, Small Island Developing States, developing nations, and international 
activists should advocate that the Council make an explicit article 39 threat 
to the peace determination.  Doing so acknowledges the state of the current 
science and likely future security impacts, setting the stage for follow-on 
enforcement action under Chapter VII.
Indeed, the Council could simply declare climate change a threat to in-
ternational peace and security under article 39 without activating its follow-
on authorities. Certainly, there is rhetorical value in this, as it places climate 
change squarely on the Council’s agenda. And doing so is not without prec-
edent—the Council declared the Ebola health crisis a threat to international 
peace and security in 2014 without fully flexing its Chapter VII authori-
ties.
256
This elevates the issue to the broader international community, pro-
vides an opportunity to “test the legitimacy waters” and set the stage for fol-
low-on action
How might an article 39 determination come about? Ideally, climate 
change would be brought to the Council’s attention via a formal process 
such as a small island nation formally seeking Council action. This request 
could help alleviate legitimacy concerns that the Council is exceeding its 
mandate. Despite current political challenges and intransigence, the Council 
remains a powerful, agenda-setting venue with tremendous delegated legal 
authorities.  Any issue before the Council gains immediate international ex-
posure. So even the Council’s non-binding resolutions, debates, and proc-
lamations may serve as a prod for action.
257
Alternatively, the Council could work with ongoing Framework Con-
vention efforts in adopting a “name and shame” approach for states that en-
gage in particularly harmful climate activities. This has already occurred in 
the environmental security context: The Council condemnation of Iraq’s en-
255. U.N. Charter art. 39.
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. See Ewing & Douglas, supra note 254, at 373.
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vironmental destruction is but one notable example.
258
Once an article 39 
determination is made, what explicit Chapter VII actions should follow?  I 
turn to that below.
2. Article 40: Taking “Such Provisional Measures”
Article 40, U.N. Charter, authorizes the Council to “call upon the par-
ties concerned to comply with such provisional measure as it deems neces-
sary or desirable.”
259
Historically, the Council has relied upon article 40 au-
thorities when calling on Member States to withdraw armed forces, cease 
hostilities, and observe ceasefires.
260
In the climate change context, the 
Council could use article 40 to urge states to accept climate migrants, assist 
developing nations in adaptation efforts, or stop the destruction of GHG 
sinks and reservoirs—such as Brazil’s decimation of the Amazon rainforest. 
Once again, these are non-binding, soft compliance measures. While its ap-
plicability to climate change remains untested, the Council has used article 
40 as a compliance tool prior to imposing sanctions or using force.
261
It also 
sets the stage for article 41 economic sanctions or diplomatic measures 
against climate rogue states, individuals, or corporations.
3. Article 41: Carefully Constructed Economic Sanctions Against 
“Climate Rogue Actors”
262
In conjunction with the proposed follow-on “Security COPs,” the 
Council should take action under article 41 under its “partial disruptions of 
economic relations” provision.
263
Doing so could target states that are fla-
grantly violating their climate change legal obligations in a manner that 
recklessly increases the threat to international peace and security. The 
framework of what activities amount to a “reckless disregard” of climate 
change should be the subject of an aforementioned Security COP.
264
Ideally, 
the proposed Security COP or Chapter VI investigation into climate-
wrongdoing should help inform the decision-making process. This could in-
clude the banning of particularly pernicious goods that contribute to global 
warming or the sanctioning of nations that fail to provide adequate climate 
oversight.
258. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 1991).
259. U.N. Charter art. 40.
260. Warren, supra note 149, at 10.
261. Id.  
262. I borrow this term from Professor Craig Martin and his work on “atmospheric in-
tervention.” Martin, supra note 10, at 334.
263. U.N. Charter art. 41.
264. At least one commentator has proposed a five-prong analytical framework for de-
termining when the Application of Article 41 is appropriate and legal. Knight, supra note 110,
at 1571–84.
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Saudi Aramco, for example, is the world’s largest oil and gas producer 
and has contributed more GHG emissions than any one corporation over the 
past fifty years.
265
Unlike other investor-backed oil companies—such as the 
privately-held Exxon and Chevron—the nation of Saudi Arabia owns Ar-
amco. Saudi Arabia, a member of the United Nations, has aggressively un-
derwritten Aramco’s fossil fuel extraction with devastating consequences 
for developing nations. The Council could investigate Saudi Arabia’s do-
mestic climate change laws and policies to inquire whether Saudi Arabia is 
encouraging destructive climate activities to the detriment of international 
peace and security. Following this investigation, the Council could consider 
instituting targeted economic sanctions against Saudi Arabia to better reflect 
the climate harm caused by Aramco’s massive carbon release.
266
Article 41—or the threat of its invocation—could once again serve as a 
powerful tool to address climate change by employing targeted sanctions to 
punish particularly destructive climate actions by nations.  This coercive au-
thority, of course, must be employed carefully. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to comprehensively address the normative implications of economic 
sanctions, but studies suggest that they often harm the most vulnerable citi-
zens and run into enforcement challenges.
267
Short of an article 41 determi-
nation, the Council could use its position to condemn nations engaging in 
particularly egregious behavior, such as Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s de-
struction of the Amazon basin in Brazil.
Alternatively, the Council could use its platform to shine a light on cor-
porations that operate with little international scrutiny and engage in par-
ticularly harmful climate activities.  Some commentators have suggested 
that such an approach could prod states toward compliance.
268
To be clear, I do not support the Council specifically using its authori-
ties to enforce the Paris Agreement’s provisions at this time. For one, the 
2015 Paris Agreement is a process-oriented, bottom-up agreement, a 
marked contrast from the more hierarchical 1997 Kyoto Protocol that faced 
265. According to the Climate Accountability Initiative, Aramco has produced 4.38 per-
cent of worldwide GHG emissions from 1965-2017.  Matthew & Jonathan Watts, Revealed: 
The 20 Firms Behind a Third of All Carbon Emissions, GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2019).
266. Council action could also include targeted sanctions imposed against individuals 
and private entities; this occurred in both the terrorism context and against individuals associ-
ated with Iran’s nuclear program.  S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 4 (December 23, 2006) (imposing target-
ed sanction on individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program).  To be sure, there is no 
shortage of states, corporations, and entities that are engaging in harmful climate behavior. I 
highlight Saudi Aramco based on its aggregate GHG emissions, weak Saudi environmental 
laws, and its unique nature as a state-owned corporation.
267. See, e.g., Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security 
Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 671, 695 (2015).
268. See Christina Voigt, Security in a “Warming World”: Competencies of the U.N. 
Security Council for Preventing Climate Change, in SECURITY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
NORMATIVE APPROACH 297, 310 (Cecilia M. Baillet ed., 2009).
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immediate resistance, leading to its failure. The Paris Accord relies upon 
voluntary nationally determined contributions that ratchet up over time.
269
Independent Council action that seeks to enforce pre-existing Paris Accord 
climate mitigation commitments would exceed the legal commitments 
agreed to by the Paris parties. While Council action offers an appealing and 
expeditious venue on climate action, it must walk a “legitimacy tightrope” 
that considers other climate efforts.
270
In sum, by making an explicit article 39 determination, the Council is 
setting the stage for future action under Chapter VII. It is also aligned with 
underlying security concerns and is accord with precedent in addressing 
non-traditional security threats. In responding to the Ebola crisis, the Coun-
cil made an explicit article 39 determination. The Council’s role on climate 
can expand or contract to match developments in climate science and the 
corresponding international action (or inaction) to reduce global GHG emis-
sions.
C. Chapter VII Actions that the Council Should Not Employ at 
This Time
Let’s consider what actions may be considered by the Council in the 
not-too-distant future but should be treated with immense caution. To be 
clear, I am not advocating that the Council take any military action to ad-
dress climate change, nor do I envision this as a particularly fruitful or help-
ful path soon.
1. A Robust Climate-Legislative Council
The Council may consider taking legislative action, akin to earlier 
Council action on terrorism and combatting the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction.
271
The Council’s 2001 resolution, for example, ordered states to 
take specific actions to counter the threat of terrorism.
While legislative action on climate may look appealing, it would be 
enormously controversial and strike at the core of the Council’s legal legit-
imacy. The 2001 and 2004 Resolutions remain controversial with some 
scholars arguing that the Council was acting ultra vires.272 Imagine a scenar-
io where the Council acted requiring nations to pass legislative action to im-
plement the Paris Accord’s emissions targets. This option may be consid-
269. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (“Each Party shall prepare, communicate 
and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.”).
270. See Bodansky, supra note 14, at 606.
271. See discussion, infra Part III.A.
272. See, e.g., Daniel Joyner, Non-Proliferation and the United Nations System: Resolu-
tion 1540 and the Limits of the Power of the Security Council, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 489, 490 
(2007); see also Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L.
901 (2002) (describing the debate about the Council’s legislative authority under international 
law).
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ered if the forthcoming 2023 “stocktake” falls far short of commitments. 
Such an action would be open to criticism that the Council is exceeding the 
scope of the Paris Agreement and that such action is not sufficiently related 
to the maintenance of peace and security. Action outside the Paris Agree-
ment—such as requiring nations to accept climate migrants from the most 
vulnerable nations fleeing environmental crisis—may be perceived as more 
legitimate because it is in response to a widening gap in international law. 
Moreover, climate migration has a more direct linkage to the maintenance 
of peace and security. Still, the Council could stop short of transforming in-
to a robust Climate-Legislative Council absent a greater acceptance of the 
Council’s role in addressing climate change.
2. Article 42: Military Measures
It is only when article 41 measures are inadequate to meet the threat, 
that Council may use its article 42 military authorities. Here, the Council 
possesses the authority to use “air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.”  In a crisis, the 
Council could turn to this authority to provide humanitarian assistance or 
evacuate displaced persons from their homeland.
This authority could be employed to encompass military-assisted hu-
manitarian assistance missions to protect citizens vulnerable to climate 
change when their own government fails to act or is incapable of protecting 
its citizens.
273
But just as the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) doctrine re-
mains enormously controversial, so too will any expansion of Responsibility 
to Protect that specifically takes into account climactic conditions.
274
Yet it 
is difficult to imagine a situation requiring such a dramatic step in the fore-
seeable future. Besides being politically difficult, this would open a “legiti-
macy Pandora’s box” that would be difficult to close.
275
Underlying con-
cerns about the “militarization” and “securitization” of climate change 
would be rekindled, distracting from the climate crisis at hand.
276
Using arti-
cle 42 authorities to address climate change is simply too blunt an instru-
ment that is fraught with too many legitimacy concerns at this time. Howev-
273. See U.N. Charter art. 42. 
274. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a thorough discussion of the Re-
sponsibility to Protect Doctrine as applied to climate change, but for a thorough discussion of 
Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”), its embrace by the human rights community, and its evolu-
tion from Kosovo to present, see SAMANTHA POWER, EDUCATION OF AN IDEALIST (2019); see
also Martin, supra note 10, at 398 (discussing humanitarian intervention in the event of “at-
mospheric intervention”). 
275. The military also releases an enormous amount of GHG emissions. See NETA C.
CRAWFORD, PENTAGON FUEL USE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE COSTS OF WAR, 2 (Brown 
Univ. Watson Inst. Int’l & Pub. Affs. Costs of War Project ed., 2019) (highlighting that the 
U.S. military alone ranks as the fifty-fifth largest emitter of GHG, larger than many European 
nations).
276. Critics of Security Council action on climate change date back until at least 1991.  
See Tinker, supra note 90, at 790.
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er, the mere potential for Chapter VII action could serve as a prod for inter-
national action, akin to common law nuisance lawsuits that have served as a 
prod for environmental action within the United States.
277
In sum, Council climate action should proceed in a principled manner in 
accordance with the governing principles outlined in Part IV. As a forum to 
address climate change, the Council has several structural advantages that 
allow for expedient action, if necessary. If the gap continues to widen be-
tween climate change’s threat to international peace and security and inter-
national action, the Council’s authorities and competencies will likely look 
attractive.  In the table C below, I highlight various options for prospective 
Council action on climate change.





Follow-On Security Council 
Conference of Parties (COPs)
Article 24 Low
Integration of Climate Security 
Matters into Security Council 
Resolutions
Article 24 and 34 Low




Formal Council Investigation on Chapter VI, Medium
281
277. Cf. Ewing & Douglas, supra note 254, at 373; see also Mark P. Nevitt & Robert V. 
Percival, Could Official Climate Denial Revive the Common Law as a Regulatory Backstop?,
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 441, 441 (2019).
278. I use the term “action” here but also note that there is likely a legitimacy concern 
for UNSC inaction based upon its Article 24 authorities. 
279. For the legitimacy concern, I use a five-part ranking (Low, Medium-Low, Medium, 
Medium-High, and High). I base my ranking by looking to any record of past practice on the 
specific UNSC action, public pronouncements from both UNSC Members and non-Members 
on the UNSC action, and underlying principles of international law. The actual legitimacy 
concern will depend heavily on the precise nature of the Council’s action.  
280. Ideally, the development of this early warning system and risk analysis would be 
integrated into the Paris Accord’s Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, 
which may include early warning systems, emergency preparedness, slow onset events, events 
that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage, comprehensive risk assessment 
and management, climate risk insurance facilities, non-economic losses, and resilience of 
communities, livelihoods, and ecosystems. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8(4)(a)–(h). 
The Pacific Island President from Nauru requested the Appointment of a “Special Representa-
tive of the Security General on Climate & Security” in Dec. 2018 in order to fill a “critical gap
in the United Nations system and provide the Council with the information it needs.” U.N. 
Security Council Press Release, supra note 210.
281. This may depend, in part, on the impetus for the investigation and its subject mat-
ter.  
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Threats Posed by Climate Change Article 34
Declare Climate Change a “Threat 
to the Peace” under Article 39
282
Article 39 Medium
Article 40 “Provisional Measures” Article 40 Medium
283
Imposition of Targeted Economic 
Sanctions
Article 41 Medium-High
Climate-Legislative Council Article 24, 48(1) High
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) on 
Climate Change – Use of Military 
Force
Article 42 Extraordinarily 
High
VI. Conclusion
This “climate-security century” will increasingly demand bold and in-
novative legal solutions.
284
We will need to think boldly about all the legal, 
policy, and technological tools at our disposal to address climate change’s 
multifaceted international peace and security challenges.
285
Due to current 
political realities, the Council may not take immediate, legally binding ac-
tion on climate change today. But it can no longer ignore advances in cli-
mate science that show a clear linkage between human-caused climate 
change and threats to peace and security. A logical first step is to simply 
acknowledge what the science demonstrates: climate change is a threat to 
international peace and security, similar to pronouncements on terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction and Ebola.
The Council is the international forum to address security matters—
fully averting its eyes to non-traditional security threats such as climate 
change is an abdication of its responsibility that it exercises on behalf of all 
193 Member nations. As such, the Council must play a measured role that 
walks a “legitimacy tightrope,” balancing its authority while ensuring that it 
does not stray from its governing security mandate. As a scientific and poli-
cy matter, we already know that climate change threatens international 
peace and security; whether the Security Council remains seized of the mat-
282. This could also entail declaring a specific climate impact a threat to the peace. I 
assess this action to be medium based upon historical practice (for example the Ebola deter-
mination that the disease is a threat to the peace).  
283. The legitimacy of this action depends heavily upon the nature and scope of these 
measures.  
284. See generally Lazarus, supra note 2.  
285. Mark Nevitt, Military Planning for the Climate Century, JUST SEC. (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/46109/planning-climate-century-u-s-worlds-militaries. (discuss-
ing the creation of a new expert governmental entity as a direct way for Congress to ensure 
that certain interests are given due weight during agency implementation of climate change 
legislation).
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ter and makes a similar legal determination with follow-on actions remains 
to be seen.  The Security Council has demonstrated its capacity tackle non-
traditional security threats to include terrorism and global health epidem-
ics.
286
This suggests a greater potential role for the Council on matters of 
climate security.  Indeed, the UN Charter already places a special trust and 
responsibility in the Security Council for the maintenance of international 
peace and security — regardless of its source.
Yet re-conceptualizing climate change as a security issue worthy of 
Council attention and action will not be without controversy: Any potential 
Security Council action must walk a fine “legitimacy tightrope” that balanc-
es its inherent, delegated authority with its understood mandate.  Straying 
too far from its mandate could prove disastrous. Yet ignoring climate 
change’s security costs and threat to individual state’s existence comes with 
its own legitimacy costs.
Climate change remains a “super-wicked problem” regardless of what 
legal approach is followed. It will result in mass migration, starvation, pan-
demics and cascading levels of armed conflict. The rise in armed conflict 
will require Council engagement and is squarely within the Council’s legal 
mandate to address. Why not take proactive steps today to ameliorate future 
human suffering and conflict?
The Security Council has powerful and unique delegated authorities to 
restore peace and security on behalf of all other Member nations.  We are 
running out of time to take international climate action. In doing so, the Se-
curity Council can fulfill a gap-filling role, plugging an ever-widening cli-
mate-security hole. Traditional international environmental laws are proving 
to be increasingly inadequate in substance (lacking a security mandate) and 
implementation (free-riding and enforcement of existing provisions). After 
all, addressing matters that undermine international peace and security are 
the ultimate responsibility of the Security Council.  After all, the earth con-
tinues to warm regardless of how we address (or fail to address) climate 
change.
286. S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 129, para. 9.

